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SEPTEMBER 1963

COMMUNIST CHINA, 1963

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October, 1963

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The Soviet Space Program

by ROBERT A. KILMARX, a senior civilian employee in the Department of Defense and author of "A History of Soviet Air Power";

Russia and Satellite Europe

by RICHARD F. STAAR, Chester W. Nimitz Chair of Social and Political Philosophy, Naval War College, and author of "Poland, 1944-1962: The Sovietization of a Captive People";

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CURRENT History

SEPTEMBER, 1963

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In this issue, seven specialists review once again recent developments in the Communist People's Republic of China, evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the current regime. Our introductory study analyzes the philosophical basis of the Sino-Soviet dispute, noting that "with the advantages afforded by hindsight, an astute observer might easily have predicted the current Sino-Soviet dialogue over revolutionary tactics as an almost ineluctable consequence of the whole course of international Communist development."

The Sino-Soviet Dialogue

BY MILTON KOVNER

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Johns Hopkins University*

LIKE A long-smoldering volcano, now active, now quiescent, the Sino-Soviet dispute has erupted anew with unprecedented intensity, and the dust has not yet settled. But amid the great clouds of Marxist rhetoric a central issue between the two great protagonists is becoming increasingly clear: how best to foster revolutionary prospects among the peoples of the underdeveloped world who now present the "weakest links" in the capitalist chain, because they emerged from colonial rule with an abundant legacy of anti-Western sentiment.

For the Chinese Communists, the underdeveloped countries are the "focus" of all capitalist "contradictions," the "storm center of world revolution"; "in a sense the revolutionary cause of the international proletariat as a whole hinges on the outcome of the peoples' struggle in these regions."¹ And the crux of Peking's argument over strategy and

tactics with Moscow is whether Khrushchev's emphasis on "peaceful economic competition" or direct revolutionary struggle in these areas will be the order of the day for the world Communist movement. What is at stake is undisputed claim to be the central arbiter of all Communist dogma and policy.

The underlying strategic concept that motivates current Soviet policies in underdeveloped areas has its doctrinal roots deep in a Communist perspective that envisages the growth of the world revolution as essentially a centripetal historical process. According to this thesis, a growing federation of industrialized Soviet republics will draw "liberated" colonies into their orbit largely by force of "economic attraction." Tactically, Soviet theoreticians visualize the transformation of underdeveloped countries to socialism as a two-stage process. In the first stage, socialist countries support bourgeois national liberation movements in which indigenous Communists play a subordinate role. In the

¹ *Peking Review*, Nos. 10 and 11 (March 15, 1963), p. 19.

second stage, socialist countries actively encourage a progressive polarization of class forces within the country in which a proletarian-peasant-based Communist alliance assumes dominant control and furthers the "social" (Communist) revolution.

THE SOVIET PREMISE

It was previously conceded, however, that "imperialism" would seek to resist this transformation through resort to force and hence the "series of frightful collisions" that Khrushchev's predecessors envisaged as inevitable for the period of transition to world communism. What is basic in more contemporary Soviet attitudes is the present leadership's assessment of the existing "correlation" of world forces—an appraisal that takes account of the nuclear stalemate and the growing economic power of the socialist countries. This stalemate, it believes, effectively denies to the West its traditional alternative of reliance on military force to resolve the East-West struggle or to thwart the national liberation movement.

Fear of a retaliatory blow, dread of retribution deters them [the imperialists] from launching a world war. The socialist commonwealth has grown so much stronger that imperialism is no longer able as before to impose its terms on peoples and dictate its will. . . . The growing preponderance of the forces of socialism . . . is leading up to a point where even before the complete victory of socialism on earth, while capitalism still exists in part of the world, it will actually be possible to exclude war from the life of society.²

Hence, in the Soviet view, the terms of peaceful coexistence may be imposed on an unwilling West permitting increasingly diverse forms of the transition to socialism. Armed uprisings and civil war are no longer deemed essential to revolutionary transformations although whether, in fact, a nonviolent solution can be realized depends primarily on

capitalism's own efforts to avert its impending collapse.

The Marxist-Leninist parties are eager to effect the socialist revolution peacefully, without civil war [the Russians assert, but] . . . the choice of paths to be taken by the revolution is not up to the working class alone. If the exploiter classes resort to violence against the people, the working class will be compelled to use non-peaceful means to win power.³

THE CHINESE ATTITUDE

If the Chinese Communists are at one with their Soviet comrades in admitting the virtue of a peaceful victory of communism, they are far less sanguine of its possibility. The Chinese deny that the emergence of nuclear weapons has changed either the character of war or the predatory and essentially aggressive nature of imperialism. They regard as particularly "absurd" the Soviet allegation that "a world without war" can be achieved through peaceful coexistence. It is one thing, they maintain, to prevent a world war and another to eliminate all wars. Oppressed people are bound to rise in revolution. When imperialism employs armed force to suppress such revolts it is inevitable that "just" wars of national liberation will occur.

From the Marxist-Leninist point of view, it would naturally be in the interests of the proletariat and the entire people if peaceful transition [to socialism] could be realized. [But] after all, possibility and reality, the wish and its fulfillment, are two different things. Hitherto, history has not witnessed a single example of peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism. Communists should not pin all their hopes for the victory of the revolution on peaceful transition. The bourgeoisie will never step down from the stage of history of its own accord. . . .⁴

True Marxist-Leninists, the Chinese claim, "have always maintained that only *after* the imperialist system has been overthrown . . . and *not before*, will it be possible to eliminate all wars and to reach 'a world without war.'"⁵ Moreover, premature use of such slogans and exaggeration of the dangers of nuclear war only benumb revolutionary fervor and paralyze the will to resist imperialism.

² *Pravda*, April 3, 1963, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. XV (May 1, 1963), p. 5.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁴ *Peking Review*, No. 1 (January 4, 1963), p. 18.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

Khrushchev, on the other hand, denies Chinese charges that he is "in favor only of the peaceful path and rejects the path of armed struggle," and challenges them to

name an instance when a Communist Party in any country . . . decided to undertake an uprising, but the C.P.S.U. came out against the method of armed struggle? . . . No, they cannot give an example of this, for none exists.⁶

But that the Kremlin continues to remain reluctant to encourage any immediate overt moves for power by Communist parties in underdeveloped countries was made patently clear in its note to the Chinese Communists in March, 1963, when it warned that "accurate analysis of the concrete situation, correct assessment of the relationship of forces is one of the cardinal requisites of revolution."

When objective and subjective conditions are ripe, there must be no checking the zeal of the revolutionary masses in the struggle for the victory of the socialist revolution. That would be like signing its death warrant. But there must be no artificial prodding of revolution if conditions are not ripe for it. The experience of revolutionary class struggle teaches us that a premature uprising is doomed to failure. . . .⁷

NEUTRALISM AND THE BOURGEOISIE

Whereas Stalin had refused to recognize in principle or in fact the existence of a "third force," an "uncommitted country," or a "neutral" in the East-West conflict, Khrushchev not only accepts the fact that between the two poles of imperialism and anti-imperialism there is a "neutralist zone," but stoutly endorses the policy of nonalignment as a practical and advantageous one for the uncommitted nations. Significantly, the current Soviet interpretation of neutralism is markedly different in emphasis from that commonly accepted by Stalin or indeed by the West. The idea of a "third force" playing an essentially passive and peripheral role in world affairs is thoroughly rejected by the

present Soviet leadership. A policy of neutralism is in no way regarded as synonymous with a renunciation of active participation in world politics or, more importantly, in the struggle against imperialism. On the contrary, the nonalignment policies of many newly emergent nations are viewed by the U.S.S.R. as a peculiar form of split in the world capitalist system—a denial to imperialism of its hitherto trusted rear or reserve. It is clearly true that neutralism in these states implies a refusal actively to participate in military alliances of either camp. But what is not an addition to the military capabilities of the socialist bloc is interpreted by Soviet strategists as a net gain in its denial of human and material resources and military bases to the "military-political system of imperialism."

The peoples fighting for their national liberation and those who have already won political independence have ceased or are ceasing to serve as imperialism's reserves. . . . The attainment of full independence by the underdeveloped countries would mean a serious new weakening of imperialism . . . and the foundation on which the exploitation of the "world village" by capitalist monopolies rests would be undermined. The development in underdeveloped countries of independent national economies drawing upon the socialist system for effective assistance will deal imperialism a heavy new blow.⁸

Reminiscent of Communist tactics toward national liberation movements before Chiang Kai-shek's "betrayal" in 1927, and again during the "popular front" movements in the mid-1930's, Khrushchev has reinvested bourgeois-nationalist leaders with an "historically useful role" in the struggle for national liberation, thus establishing the basis for "lengthy cooperation" between them and the countries of socialism. The extension of Bloc economic ties with newly emergent nations is designed further to preempt traditional Western economic domination and to deny to capitalism unrestricted access to the markets and sources of cheap labor and strategic raw materials on which a substantial part of its strength is presumed to rest.

The Soviet position accedes to the Chinese view that the national bourgeoisie is "fickle and inclined to compromise with the im-

⁶ *Pravda*, January 17, 1963, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. XV (February 20, 1963), p. 17.

⁷ *Pravda*, April 3, 1963, loc. cit., p. 6.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

perialists." But what seems of major significance in current Soviet attitudes toward such non-Communist governments is not the ideological commitments and ultimate ambitions of one or another of the contemporary national bourgeois leaders but the more immediate goals toward which they strive and the "objective" consequences (such as Nasser's anti-Western bent) of their actions. Despite their schizophrenic tendencies and regardless of whether they themselves realize the full meaning of the revolution in which they have taken part, the "nonalignment" policies of such bourgeois nationalist leaders enable them to play, in the Kremlin's eyes, an essential role in the anti-imperialist struggle. They become unwitting allies in the development of the world socialist revolution. "We do not conceal the fact that we and some leaders of the U.A.R. have different views in the ideological field," admitted Khrushchev at the Twenty-first Congress of the C.P.S.U., "but in questions of struggle against the danger of war, our positions coincide with the positions of those same leaders."⁹

Therefore differences in ideology, outlook and social systems need not impede the development of friendly state-to-state relations with such governments, and even overt anti-communism may be tolerated, within the context of Khrushchev's more "creative" approach to the national liberation movement:

The right wing of the national bourgeoisie, intent on consolidating its dominant position after independence has been won, may establish for a time reactionary political regimes and subject Communists and other democrats to persecution. Such regimes are short-lived, however, if only because they hinder progress, the accomplishment of urgent national tasks. . . . This is why . . . these regimes will be swept away by the action of the masses.¹⁰

⁹ *Pravda*, January 28, 1959.

¹⁰ *Pravda*, April 3, 1963, *loc. cit.*, p. 7.

¹¹ "The Socialist World System and the National-Liberation Movement," *World Marxist Review*, Vol. 6 (March, 1963), p. 56.

¹² A. Rumyantsev, "Our Common Ideological Weapon," *World Marxist Review*, Vol. 5 (January, 1962), p. 5.

Within this broader Soviet perspective, Soviet economic and other assistance to "transitory" bourgeois nationalist regimes is viewed as helping to build up an economic system which ultimately will become the legacy of a Communist regime. "Over the heads of the rulers this aid opens the door to the future for the masses," asserts the authoritative and Soviet-oriented *World Marxist Review*.¹¹ Well can Khrushchev aver that his policy is one of aid to peoples rather than to governments: Nassers may come and go, he once remarked, but the Aswan Dam as a symbol of Communist aid will stand forever.

The Soviet Union repeatedly asserts that "only those who have lost their political acumen . . . can regard economic competition . . . as mere commercial rivalry. Only the non-Leninist can fail to see that economic competition between the two diametrically opposed systems is the cardinal political factor of our day, a form of class struggle on an international scale."¹² Yet the Chinese have registered strong objections to the direction and motivation of the Soviet foreign lending program. For Communist China, trade and aid is not the prime issue. But because it is an essential element in the Soviet program in underdeveloped countries, the Chinese undoubtedly regard it as a vital issue within the context of their general criticism of over-all Soviet strategy.

China's objections to Soviet aid policies appear to center on the questions of priorities and of which specific nationalist regimes are to be aided and to what degree, rather than on the issue of whether or not to extend aid. Peking has obviously been influenced by what it believes to be its own regional and national needs; thus it loudly denounces large-scale Soviet aid to India (a direct antagonist of the Chinese) when many needs of the Soviet Union's more deserving allies (presumably itself) ostensibly remain unfulfilled.

The Chinese and their Albanian allies have exhibited particular resentment against Khrushchev's suggestions that Western acceptance of his disarmament proposals would free resources for more highly developed states

to extend economic assistance to less developed countries. "Does he perhaps think that general and complete disarmament would automatically solve the national liberation problem," they ask, "and that the subjugated peoples should remain with their arms folded awaiting disarmament?"¹³ The U.S.S.R. has denied the "distorted" charges of its "left-wing critics" that its disarmament policies would indeed impede the national liberation movement on grounds that "the interests of the national liberation movement urgently require general disarmament because this would deprive imperialism of the armed force it now uses to prolong its colonial rule."¹⁴ Yet the Chinese have remained adamant in rejecting the idea that underdeveloped countries would derive any material benefits from disarmament.

At a time when the imperialists are frantically carrying out arms expansion and war preparations, we have every reason to say that the proposition of aiding so-called underdeveloped countries with money supposedly to be saved from disarmament is an illusion and a deceitful nonsense. Such a proposition is extremely harmful and will weaken the fighting spirit of the people in their struggle against imperialism.¹⁵

"NATIONAL DEMOCRACY"

In what appeared to be a tactical effort to forestall Chinese "doctrinarians and Leftists," who seek to "jump over certain historical stages," a vaguely worded and ill-defined concept of the "national democratic state" was inserted at Soviet suggestion in the Statement of the Moscow Conference of 81 Communist Parties in December, 1960. The calculated vagueness with which the Statement dealt with the concept of national democracy and Peking's subsequent silence on the thesis suggest that Moscow's more gradualist formula for the period of transition between

national liberation and socialist revolution in underdeveloped countries has not met with Chinese acceptance.

Designed, apparently, to formalize the transitional stage of development in countries where "capitalism has lived out its day, but the conditions for socialism have not yet matured," the "national democratic" government is to consist of a ruling coalition embracing elements of the working class, the peasantry, the democratic intelligentsia and the anti-imperialist strata of the national bourgeoisie. "National democracy" does not pose as its immediate goal the liquidation of all exploiting classes or the construction of Soviet-style socialism but rather the completion of the "bourgeois-democratic, national-liberation, anti-imperialist, and anti-feudal revolution." Significantly, among the criteria for a national democratic state, collectivization and other more refined aspects of Soviet socialism are omitted in an apparent effort to establish a program which could be accepted by a number of non-Marxist-Leninist "socialist" parties in the underdeveloped world. Indeed, at its inception,

national democracy can be established under the leadership of *any* democratic class—the working class, the peasantry, or the small urban bourgeoisie. In some countries, the leading force may be the intelligentsia, including the revolutionary army officers.¹⁶

While not essentially contradicting the viewpoint of the U.S.S.R. the Chinese Communist approach is markedly different in emphasis. Operating under the Maoist dictum of "alliance and struggle," no objections are interposed to Bloc military and economic aid which helps newly emergent colonial peoples first to secure and then to consolidate their national independence. But Communist China's own bitter experience in collaborating with the Kuomintang in the 1920's is offered as evidence that unless indigenous Communists, *from the very outset*, assume active leadership of national revolutionary movements, the fruits of revolution will ultimately be appropriated by the imperialist world with whom the upper middle classes in the new countries still retain strong financial and other

¹³ *Zeri i Popullit* (Tirana), March 2, 1962.

¹⁴ Dolgoplov, "Disarmament and the Newly Developing States," *International Affairs*, No. 2 (February, 1962), p. 57.

¹⁵ *Peking Review*, No. 7 (February 15, 1963), p. 8.

¹⁶ A. Sobolev, "National Democracy—The Way to Social Progress," *World Marxist Review*, Vol. 6 (February, 1963), p. 44.

ties. Undue delay in assumption of positions of power by the peasant-proletarian classes, coupled with indiscriminate Bloc economic and military assistance to the bourgeois leadership, may only serve to help consolidate the positions of the middle class and make necessary another and more protracted armed struggle enabling the workers to seize power.

The Chinese Communists denounce as illusory in concept and revisionist in thinking Soviet suggestions that the development of these countries to socialism can be achieved under the direction of other classes and other parties, and that it is possible to do so without smashing the bourgeois state machine and replacing it with the dictatorship of the proletariat.

It is known that one of the fundamental theses of Marxism-Leninism . . . is the principle that the transition from capitalism to socialism can only be achieved under the direction of the working class and of its revolutionary [Communist] party and by installing the dictatorship of the proletariat. In the propaganda of the Khrushchev group . . . this fundamental thesis is forgotten. . . . On the contrary, it is implied that the non-capitalist development of these countries can also be achieved under the direction of other classes and other parties. . . .¹⁷

In an attempt to strengthen their own argument, the Chinese have underrated both the subtlety and the militancy of the national democratic formula. The Russians themselves have clearly indicated that something far more radical is envisaged.

In the course of its implementation and completion under the distinctive conditions of a national democratic state, this revolution will transcend the framework of a bourgeois revolution. Just as the bourgeoisie itself, on having

initiated the revolution, cannot bring it to an end and participation by more radically disposed social forces is needed, so the revolution, after its completion, will prove to be broader and deeper than it seemed at first.¹⁸

Tactically, the process of transition from national democracy to socialism will be accelerated by the inexorable development of the class struggle—a struggle made inevitable by the very differentiation of class forces within the national front. The center of gravity in the national democratic state is expected to shift inevitably to the Left, to enlist on its side the majority of the people, to unite this majority against the minority representation in the national front in order, as it were, to lay social “siege” to it and ultimately to compel it to “surrender.”

The Soviet letter to the Chinese Communist party on July 14, 1963, in defiance of Chinese sensitivities on the subject, reaffirmed Moscow’s belief in the “national front” formula as a relevant definition of the sort of environment in a non-Communist state that will lead it into following a Communist course.

The goals of the . . . Communist Parties in the national liberation movement lie . . . in the development and consolidation of the national front, based on the alliance with the peasantry and the . . . national bourgeoisie, in the preparation of conditions for the setting up of a state of the national democracy and transition to the non-capitalist road of development.¹⁹

It has been said that nothing appears so inevitable as that which has already occurred. But an astute observer might easily have predicted the current Sino-Soviet dialogue over revolutionary tactics as an almost ineluctable consequence of the whole course of international communism. It would be surprising indeed if with their different revolutionary experiences and stages of economic and social development, the Russians and the Chinese did not hold some divergent views of the revolutionary process.

But never before has it become so imperative for international communism tactically to formulate what hitherto has sufficed as merely abstract strategic objectives which all could comfortably share by virtue of their common Marxist heritage. For in sharp

¹⁷ *Zari i Popullit*, March 2, 1962. A quote from an Albanian Communist party journal but expressive of the Chinese position.

¹⁸ *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya*, No. 4 (April, 1962), p. 82.

¹⁹ *The New York Times*, July 15, 1963, page 14. At this date, no “national democratic” states have as yet been recognized as such, although Soviet spokesmen have consistently pointed to Indonesia, Guinea, Ghana and Mali as examples of “prospective” national democracies.” Cuba, originally hailed by Bloc spokesmen as a “national democracy,” apparently has been unwilling to accept the formula. Significantly, the Soviet slogans for May Day, 1963, acknowledge Cuba as in the process of “building socialism.”

contrast to the introverted and largely defensive efforts of prewar communism to construct "socialism in one country" in the midst of a hostile "capitalist encirclement," the rapid pace of postwar Communist achievement itself has compelled its leadership more urgently to come to grips with the vastly more complicated tasks of what they regard as the next stage of world history. Lenin himself warned that divergencies between reactionary and "leftist" bourgeois leaders

are quite unimportant from the standpoint of pure, i.e., abstract Communism, i.e., Communism that has not yet matured to the stage of practical, mass, political action. But from the standpoint of this practical mass action, these differences are very, very important.²⁰

For us in the West, internal bloc differences over the "pace" with which Communist revolutionary ambitions are to be implemented—whatever the apparent disarray they cause within the Communist camp—should not induce any undue complacency. The ideological disaffection of China leaves Soviet military and economic power basically the same. Chinese taunts that the Soviet leaders have become "timid as mice" are not likely to impel the U.S.S.R. into any more activist strategy in Berlin and elsewhere where Soviet policies have hitherto been defined more by Western determination and by balance of power calculus than by doctrinal inhibitions.

In underdeveloped areas, too, there is no firm evidence that the Soviet leadership has revised any of its fundamental assumptions under the impact of Chinese criticisms. Indeed, it has sought to defend with increased vigor the true militancy of its program of peaceful economic competition and the implicit connection of that policy with the wider political objectives of the national liberation movement. However, in view of the mounting problems and disappointments of Soviet coexistence strategy in Africa, Iraq, and elsewhere, Khrushchev himself may be realizing its limited potential as a factor in the national

liberation movement. The recent decline in new Soviet economic aid extensions to underdeveloped countries, for example, from annual commitments of almost \$800 million in 1959 and 1960 to less than \$150 million in 1962 may have coincided with a more critical appraisal by the Kremlin of its aid policy—an appraisal in which the politico-strategic returns commensurate with foreign aid resources expended are reviewed rigorously.

It was clear from the Sino-Soviet confrontation in Moscow in July, 1963, that Chinese insistence on the national liberation movement as the fulcrum on which the success or failure of the world revolution must hinge was an ill-disguised bid for support among the backward nations. "In this way," Moscow complained, "the Chinese comrades apparently wish to win in the easiest way popularity among the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America."²¹

The Sino-Soviet "agreement to disagree" bodes growing rivalry in underdeveloped countries. The dynamic nature of Communist ambitions in underdeveloped areas, whether Chinese or Soviet, portends an inexorable course of development leading finally to a growing incompatibility between world Communist and local nationalist goals. This situation could be altered only by the virtual abandonment of Communist long-range objectives (of attaining a predominant measure of control over the destinies of these countries) or by the eventual accomplishment of such objectives. With the first development unlikely, any prolonged delay in the second development could inspire an impatience within the world Communist movement to "get on" with the revolution and a growing sentiment in favor of more extreme, i.e., Chinese, solutions.

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²⁰ V. I. Lenin, *Left-Wing Communism, An Infantile Disorder* (New York, International Publishers, 1940), p. 75.

²¹ *The New York Times*, July 15, 1963, p. 13.

Why did China choose to make war in India? "Some very convincing evidence points to the conclusion that control over the Aksai Chin area to protect the Tibet Sinkiang Highway was the major motivating force behind China's action." As this specialist evaluates the conflict, "China considers the highway vital in her inner Asia policy and India has the misfortune of owning the territory through which it runs." If this premise is correct, the Sino-Indian border war "is related to the Soviet Union rather than to India."

The Sino-Indian Border War

BY WERNER LEVI

Professor of Political Science, University of Hawaii

THE BORDER WAR between China and India in the fall of 1962 demonstrated two important aspects of China's foreign policy. China is determined to bring under her sovereignty such territory as was once considered part of the Chinese Empire; and she is using the thousands of miles of frontier with neighboring countries as a political tool. These aims are favored by the conditions affecting the border regions. Most of China's neighbors are small, weak, and often difficult to reach by potential allies. Many sectors of the frontier are undemarcated, particularly those situated in the Himalayan mountain ranges. The turbulent history of these regions, in so far as it is recognized as a just basis for territorial claims, can be used to support almost any demand.

The Chinese government is fully exploiting the troublemaking opportunities. It confounds the confusion by advancing and withdrawing territorial claims, changing maps, raising border issues to maintain unrest and insecurity. Not until the 1960's were border agreements finally ratified with Burma, Nepal and Pakistan, and serious negotiations begun with other countries. Even then, each settlement left enough uncertainty for future disputes. In relation to Burma, there had been ominous references to the need for awaiting a "People's Burma" and the "final victory

of the Asian People's Revolution" before the border problems could be solved completely and reasonably. The border between China and Nepal was surveyed, marked, and agreed upon "in final and complete settlement"—according to the Chinese—between 1961 and 1963. But there is no official reference to the peak of Mount Everest, which at one time the Chinese claimed as their territory and which the Nepalese foreign minister, on his return home from Peking in January, 1963, declared to be a part of Nepal.

The boundary agreement with Pakistan was concluded in March, 1963, with the proviso that a final agreement on the borderline would have to await a settlement of the Kashmir dispute. When it is further considered that the territories and countries involved in these "settlements" are relatively unimportant, that the agreements were finalized in coincidence with the height of the Sino-Indian border war, and that the "peaceful methods" employed served as the basis for an intensive propaganda campaign to demonstrate China's reasonableness, it becomes clear that these border issues were used primarily to create a favorable picture of China in her border war with India.

The over-all, expansionist goal expressed in this border policy has its roots in Chinese nationalism, or can be dated back even fur-

ther in a Chinese tradition several thousand years old that territory once acquired and civilized by China must forever remain Chinese. Communist claims and, indeed, to some extent actions are identical with those of preceding regimes: nationalist, revolutionary, and imperial. The Nationalist government on Formosa has criticized the Communist government for the manner in which it adjusts the borders, but not for the adjustments themselves. It has specifically supported the Communist position that the MacMahon Line in the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) is "illegal." It has altogether been silent on the Sino-Indian border war, except to warn the neutralists against any cooperation with the untrustworthy Communists.

A further index that Chinese ambitions rather than ideology underlie the border policy is that the Soviet Union is not exempted from Chinese territorial aims. Initially, Prime Minister Chou En-lai, during a visit to Nepal in April, 1960, explained away differences between Chinese and Soviet maps as "very small discrepancies" that could easily be settled. But as the cold war between Moscow and Peking proceeded, territorial questions assumed greater importance. In reply to some stinging remarks from Moscow and the American Communist party about China's permitting imperialists to remain on Formosa, Hong Kong and Macao, Peking reminded its critics that old treaties, including those concluded with czarist Russia, would be reviewed, abrogated, revised or re-negotiated "according to their respective contents." This could mean the involvement of thousands of square miles of territory Imperial Russia once took from China. Clearly, in Chinese eyes Communist internationalism is one thing and the Chinese empire another.

If this is a correct analysis of the basic approach of the Chinese government to foreign affairs, its goals, policies, strategies, and tactics become more easily understandable in terms of traditional international politics. These will, of course, be affected and modified to some extent by the Chinese traditions and the Communist ideology of the leaders. But there is no need to discard the

lessons taught by hundreds of years of international relations and to look for entirely fresh explanations of a behavior which, after all, is not unique in the world. Nor is there any need for the free world to remain passive in the face of aggression, as a result of unjustified fascination with Communist "dynamism."

BEGINNINGS OF THE BORDER WAR

The events leading up to the border war in October, 1962, date back to almost the first year of the Communist regime, or, if the Chinese interpretation is accepted, to the manipulation of the border regions by the British "imperialists." The "liberation" of Tibet in 1950 at once aroused Indian concern. Tibet had served well until then as a buffer between China and India, which obviated the need for a more clear-cut definition of the frontier admittedly obscure in many places. The integration of Tibet into China and the arrival of Chinese troops on the frontier led Prime Minister Nehru to suggest to Peking a settlement of the Indo-Tibetan border. China's ambiguous answer foreshadowed at that early time the tactics of her border policies. It was that China would not keep unequal treaties. Nehru, trying to establish a precedent and anticipating future difficulties, announced that map or no map, the MacMahon line was India's border which nobody would be allowed to cross. He did not realize, until much later, that China's imperial interests were more pressing at the opposite western end of the common border.

For a few years, little was heard of the border. In 1962, the Chinese were even attempting to create the impression that thanks to their peacefulness "tranquillity [had] generally prevailed" from 1950 to 1958, though "India was already sowing seeds for provoking future boundary disputes and border clashes." In truth, and much to their regret now, the Indians ignored the border while the Chinese were feverishly active. The reason for the seeming calm was that the Chinese had entered a period of quiet in their foreign policy, after their adventures in Korea, Tibet, and the Formosa Straits, and

in their preoccupation with the consolidation of power in Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, and Sinkiang. They needed time to digest their past and to prepare for their future gains. This led to considerable activity in the political, propaganda, and military sphere and to a large extent was preparatory to and is now running parallel with the challenge to India.

In the middle 1950's, China tried hard to create a favorable picture of herself among the peoples of Asia. This attempt culminated in China's "peaceful" posture during the Geneva Conference in 1954 on Korea and Indochina, and her eager sponsorship of the "Bandung spirit" during the Afro-Asian Conference in 1955. The aim was obviously to make it inconceivable that China, the champion of Asian solidarity, could ever act aggressively against a fellow-Asian nation. In the same year, with the support of Nehru's persuasive powers, China established diplomatic relations with a reluctant Nepal. This led promptly to a lively exchange of political, cultural, and educational missions; financial and technical aid; and the influx of great numbers of Chinese experts into Nepal.

In other parts of the Himalayan region China advanced the idea of federation among the politically separate but ethnically and otherwise related peoples. The latest of these schemes, proposed semi-officially during 1962 and 1963, was a Confederation of Himalayan States, composed of Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, the North East Frontier Agency and Nagaland. To the distress of many Asian leaders, these activities appeared to increase China's influence; what was worse, her schemes had considerable appeal for some sections and important leaders among the peoples concerned. Any fears about ulterior motives were usually assuaged by ample references to China's peaceful border negotiations with Burma, Nepal, and Pakistan and her respect for the independence of Asian states.

These official and diplomatic measures have been accompanied by a vigorous campaign of propaganda and subversion all along the Himalayan border. This has been proceeding since 1950, but assumed greater

force since about 1958. Every conceivable means has been used to win the sympathy of the border peoples, to inspire them with both fear and admiration of China, and to make them disloyal to their own governments. Rebels in their own countries have found refuge in China. Chinese agents have entered the border areas disguised as traders, pilgrims or refugees. Rumors detrimental to their own government are spread among the border peoples. Printed materials of a subversive nature are freely distributed.

Finally and most impressively, the Chinese have converted their Himalayan border region into something resembling an armed camp. Considering the enormous difficulties confronting such an enterprise, this is a stunning achievement. At enormous expense in lives, health and materials strategic roads have been constructed, many of them usable even during the winter months; airfields have been built; vast numbers of year-round checkpoints have been established in the most inhospitable territory; a network of communications has been created; and hundreds of thousands of soldiers are fully maintained all along the border. The whole south of Tibet was readied as a formidable base, obviously for the purpose of military adventures, since such elaborate measures were not needed to police Tibet and no attack from the south was reasonably to be expected.

The frequency, intensity and seriousness of Sino-Indian border incidents appeared carefully attuned to the gradual strengthening of China's political and strategic position in the Himalayan region. Even while an Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet and India was signed in the summer of 1954, containing the famous Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, the Chinese were contemplating the construction of a road through Indian territory in Ladakh. To assure complete control over the road and, presumably, secrecy of its construction, the Chinese protested the presence of Indian troops in Barahoti (Wuje in Chinese) in the state of Uttar Pradesh. India refuted the charge.

In the fall of that year, 1954, Nehru raised

the border question in Peking. He questioned his Chinese hosts about maps showing sections of Indian territory within China. Prime Minister Chou En-lai assured Nehru that these maps had been taken over from the Nationalists and that there had not yet been enough time to print new, correct ones. In every way the Chinese Prime Minister reinforced Nehru's view that the border issue was minor; that the territories in question were largely uninhabited and of such a nature that any discrepancies could be settled by a friendly arrangement. Chou told Nehru what the Indian wanted to hear and the Chinese wanted him to believe. Nehru felt so strongly about the insignificance of the border issue that initially he did not disclose to the public the news, when he first learned it, that the Chinese had seized important sections of Indian territory in Ladakh. He was afraid an aroused public sentiment might spoil the possibility of a peaceful settlement and interfere with good Sino-Indian relations which he was determined to maintain.

As became increasingly clear, to the Chinese this was an invitation to help themselves to territory the Indians were little interested in and over which they kept no watch. They did so liberally and secretly, issuing new maps (in 1956) covering the seizure. All the while they deflected attention from themselves by accusing the Indians of occupying Chinese territory south of the "illegal" MacMahon Line on the eastern sector of the frontier, of encroaching upon Chinese territory in the middle sector (between Ladakh and Nepal), and even of penetrating into Chinese territory in the western sector.

BORDER BECOMES MILITARY ISSUE

In 1957, China published news of the construction of the Tibet Sinkiang Highway and a map printed in 1958 showed it running across Indian-owned Ladakh. An Indian protest remained unheeded and an Indian border patrol advancing into the area was detained by the Chinese for several weeks. The border issue was changing from a verbal squabble into a series of military incidents.

Together with the "Great Leap Forward" in internal developments, China's attitude in foreign affairs became more aggressive. Early in 1959, Chou En-lai claimed large areas in Ladakh as Chinese. He confessed that Communist China now accepted the Nationalist maps as correct because she was "ready" to do so and to press the border issue. Incidents increased. New maps appeared on both sides and each began to fortify the border, establish new advanced check-posts, and patrol the formerly untouched areas. The Chinese, in 1959, built an additional road west of the Tibet Sinkiang Highway and new feeder roads designed to supply their outposts. The Indians began to build supply routes into the hitherto almost inaccessible and unguarded territory. The crucial area was the Aksai Chin plateau in Ladakh. Chinese and Indian outposts and patrols became interspersed and interwoven in such an interlocking pattern that unending incidents and sustained tension became inevitable. It became virtually impossible to determine who controlled what line at which time. Inability to decide objectively upon that line is today one of the reasons, or more correctly one of the alleged reasons, for the continued dispute.

In April, 1960, Chou En-lai visited New Delhi. He came to suggest a barter. China would accommodate India along the NEFA sector, staying behind the MacMahon Line, if India would be willing to accommodate China in Ladakh. This was the first clear indication of the importance China ascribed to the highway in Ladakh. India rejected such a proposition then and ever since. The talks failed. Subsequent talks between lesser officials also failed. India's position was taken by China as the signal for tougher action. Chinese claims on Indian territory continuously increased. A confusing array of new Chinese maps supported them. Uncertainty or contradictory claims about the position of the border enabled both sides to claim airspace violations and intrusions by patrols. Clashes involving deaths occurred on several occasions. The tone of the verbal exchanges; the activities of both sides; the tension in the

border areas presaged the outbreak of violence. It came in the form of a massive attack by the Chinese at various points of the border on October 20, 1962, but mainly in the NEFA region.

The Indians were obviously unprepared and retreated in the face of overwhelming power. On October 24, the Chinese offered a three point proposal for the "peaceful" settlement of the border dispute. It would have given them what they wanted had the Indians accepted. The war proceeded unfavorably for India. The Chinese advanced deep into the NEFA region, but did not press far into Ladakh. On November 21, the Chinese declared unilaterally a cease-fire, to begin the next day, and announced that beginning December 1 their troops would withdraw. The measure was received with great skepticism in India and pleasant surprise in many parts of Asia. Although the shooting stopped from that moment on, the dispute has continued unabated. The reason is that the parties cannot agree on the line to which troops should be withdrawn by either side before negotiations can begin. This difference is, however, not really a matter of unreasonableness or uncertainty about what each side means—as each party tries to explain—but goes directly to the crux of the whole dispute. In calculating the area to be evacuated by Chinese troops, the Chinese government insists that "the line of actual control which existed between China and India on November 7, 1959," should serve as the basis. The Indian government insists that before it can begin to negotiate the position as it existed on September 8, 1962, must be reestablished.

THE DISPUTED FRONTIER

The demands of the two governments appear confusing at first sight because the earlier line suggested by the Chinese, referring to a date preceding the main clashes, appears to be more favorable to India than India's suggested line, referring to a date after many of these clashes had taken place and China had advanced into some Indian territory. The Chinese tried their best to confirm this impression by emphasizing that "the Chinese fron-

tier guards will be far behind their positions prior to September 8, 1962," if the Chinese suggestion were followed. The reason why this statement appeared true on the surface was that the Chinese by a constant shift of borderlines, editing of maps, and changing of claims had completely confused the border situation. Under the cloak of this confusion, however, they had consistently advanced their border into Indian territory so that when they talked about a line of November 7, 1959, a good deal of territory belonging to India was included.

On the eastern sector of the front, the difference between the Chinese and Indian suggested line was not too substantial. But in the western sector, the Chinese suggestion would have left China in possession of the Aksai Chin area, through which the Tibet Sinkiang Highway travelled. This is the crux of the dispute. To make sure that this area would remain theirs, they added several qualifications to their ceasefire; among them a specific prohibition to the Indians against recovering their positions prior to September 8, 1962, or restoring their 43 strongpoints in the Aksai Chin area, situated not far from the highway. At this point, developments remained when winter arrived. The war changed to a propaganda battle whose field became the whole world.

Eager to maintain their reputation as the defenders of peace and sponsors of Asian solidarity, the Chinese returned Indian prisoners and war material; emphasized the voluntary and unilateral nature of the cease-fire; explained their position in letters and through messengers to the nations of Asia and Africa. They accused the Indian government of continued intrusions into Chinese territory, of preparing for a resumption of the fighting, and of maltreating Chinese citizens in India. The Indians, clearly the victims of aggression, had no need to gloss over their actions. Instead they constructively suggested submission of the dispute to the World Court and full acceptance of the proposals of six Afro-Asian states (Ceylon, Burma, Indonesia, Ghana, Cambodia, and the United Arab Republic) for a peaceful settlement. Both suggestions

were rejected by the Chinese, although initially and with some qualifications Peking appeared to have accepted the proposals.

The immediate question was why the Chinese halted their victorious campaign and withdrew some of their troops? The Chinese answered rather simply and, from their standpoint, convincingly. They were acting purely in self-defense, they said, and there was no further need for action after the aggressor had been repelled. They were eager, they asserted, to revert to a state of peace in "the fundamental interests of the Chinese and Indian peoples and the common desires of all the people of the world." Fighting between two Asian nations would violate the Bandung spirit; break Afro-Asian solidarity; and play only into the hands of imperialism and reaction. Thus, they continued the propaganda line which had accompanied all their border violations and the final attack; namely, that China was the reluctant dragon who, after "immense self-restraint and forbearance," for the sake of peace was finally drawn into a violent conflict through India's aggressive actions.

How effective this propaganda may have been with its main targets, the neutralist nations, is difficult to judge. The obvious reluctance of most of them to take a stand was in most cases motivated not so much by genuine indecision as by fear of Chinese retaliation and the need they felt to remain on speaking terms with the Communist world. Much to India's chagrin, of 55 Afro-Asian nations only two spontaneously offered support of India's position, while only 18 showed sympathy after a good deal of Indian prodding. But all were relieved at the end of the fighting.

Some Communist countries and parties showed much less reluctance to put the blame for the war on China.¹ Nikita Khrushchev, summarizing the official Soviet position, told the Supreme Soviet on December 12, 1962, that where there was a will, frontier issues could be solved peacefully. Only imperialists

could rejoice in an Asian border conflict. It would certainly have been better therefore had China not advanced into India at all. But since she had, China's cease-fire was not a retreat but a show of wisdom, reason, and understanding. China's move could be explained on two grounds, he elaborated. The imperialists wished for a big war. Now they could not have it because China had "considered" this and wisely frustrated imperialist desires. Continued Chinese action could only strengthen the reactionaries and militarists inside India and cause a setback to democracy. This too, "it seems," China had considered.

Khrushchev's interpretation was in tune with a Soviet attitude, cautious and conciliatory, but nevertheless critical in relation to China. Statements and publications emanating from Moscow left no doubt that China was considered the aggressor. Many Communist parties expressed this opinion more pronouncedly (e.g., American, French, Italian, Indian). Others sided fully with China (Albania, North Vietnam, North Korea); while most either refrained from expressing any opinion at all or tried hard to sit on the fence. Though the Chinese complained bitterly that the Soviet Union was calling the Chinese brothers but treating the Indians like kinsmen and asked in puzzlement what had happened to proletarian internationalism, they could not afford to abandon Communist solidarity and support. For this reason, Khrushchev's explanation of China's motivations may well have been correct. Others might be added to them. Winter was coming and China's lines were—perhaps unexpectedly far—extended into Indian territory. Unfriendly reactions to China's aggression were perhaps more widespread than the Chinese had calculated, endangering her picture as a peace-loving nation. Probably China never intended more than a Blitzkrieg (otherwise she would hardly have started it in October) fully expecting it to be victorious and thus forcing India to negotiate on Chinese terms. A major short-run objective, the possession of Aksai Chin, had been reached. The balance could be improved in favor of

¹ For details of the influence of the Sino-Indian border war on Sino-Soviet and Sino-Southeast Asian relations, see other articles in this issue.

China by a unilateral cease-fire because of the favorable propaganda effect this measure would have. On all these grounds, the Chinese measure becomes understandable. But there is still the broader question why the Chinese chose to make war on India at all? Its answer necessarily leads into the realm of speculation.

THE TIBET-SINKIANG HIGHWAY

Some very convincing evidence points to the conclusion that control over the Aksai Chin area to protect the Tibet Sinkiang Highway was the major motivating force behind China's action. The highway is important to China for several reasons. It has proven of extraordinary value in maintaining control over Tibet; it represents a valuable route of access to Sinkiang; it could be strategically relevant in any dispute with India; and it has an over-all value for influence in the increasingly significant area of Inner Asia. During the 1959 rebellion in Tibet, the highway provided the only reliable access to Tibet. Weather conditions did not interfere with its usefulness, and it was under no threat from natural catastrophes or the ambushes of hostile tribes as was the major other access under Chinese control from the east. In Sinkiang, the Chinese have made tremendous efforts to develop that province and integrate it with China. Even if astonishing claims of achievements there are likely to be exaggerated, the fact that they are made and the attention devoted to them in China would indicate that the Chinese consider Sinkiang to have great importance.

Furthermore, a projected railroad, to run north-south across the center of Sinkiang, is to be connected by a feeder road to the highway. The growing significance of Tibet and Sinkiang is further enhanced by the importance Central Asia is assuming in general through economic development and through the gradual elimination of buffer states and tribal no-man's-lands, with the consequent meeting of the Soviet Union, China and India. The Tibet Sinkiang Highway thus assumes great significance as a means of influence and control not merely in Tibet and Sin-

kiang but in the whole Central Asian region. In that region, Russia has always shown considerable interest and has never hesitated to interfere in one way or another. India, on the other hand, at least since independence, could not possibly be suspected of harboring imperialistic designs in the foreseeable future.

CHINA'S MOTIVES

It would therefore not be totally amiss to speculate that China's ulterior motive in making war on India for the sake of the Aksai Chin area is related to the Soviet Union rather than to India. China considers the highway vital in her Inner Asia policy and India has the misfortune of owning the territory through which it runs. For this very same reason, the Soviet Union is opposed to China in this region and considers her interests important enough publicly to criticize China's action and side with India. But whatever China's ulterior motives, the Aksai Chin area is obviously crucial. All the proposals she has made in the last three years for a peaceful settlement of the border dispute; all the bargains she has suggested; the rationale of her military measures and of her border policies toward neighboring states point consistently to her one desire of undisputed and undisturbed possession of the Aksai Chin area surrounding the highway. If she can achieve this, a peaceful border between India and China might be secured for some time to come. If she cannot, hostilities are likely to continue.

Compared to this major objective, others fade into the background, and there is no such strong evidence available for any one of them. On the other hand, there is no reason to doubt that the Chinese were happy to take advantage of any favorable side effects their action against India might have had, while the price they had to pay for their action appears to make it clear, again, that these were indeed side effects rather than major objectives.

To demonstrate India's weakness and China's prowess may have given a boost to the leadership of Asia to which China undoubtedly aspires. Yet many Chinese must

have some doubts about the desirability and the solidity of a following based on fear. Ruination of neutralism and greater polarization of power—often assumed to be a Chinese goal—would be in line with gaining a following, if the nations confronted with the need for a choice would opt for China. If this were one of China's aims, it has not been reached. Actually, Mao Tse-tung's initial condemnation of neutralism has not been followed up for many years. On the contrary, the Chinese for several years have tried to discredit Nehru as a spurious neutralist rather than discrediting neutralism itself. In answer to Communist and neutralist criticism that they were driving Nehru into imperialist arms, they hammered away at the theme, that because Nehru had embraced imperialists long ago they were finally forced "in self-defense" to fight him.

The further assumption, also often heard, that the Chinese used the attack on India to force the Soviet Union into a decision for or against China is not very convincing. Surely their clear-cut goal to gain control over the Aksai Chin area in order to augment access and influence in Inner Asia could hardly have endeared them to their Soviet brothers and would have been a poor test of the Soviet Union's friendship. Nor is there an impressive thesis that China, much more than the Soviet Union, desires a general war. This is not borne out by a detailed examination of China's records and statements. The Chinese may desire unrest and tensions, but not a general war. They could produce it easily enough. Up to now, they have given the impression of cautiously calculating the consequences of their actions and of trying to avoid starting a sequence of events whose final consequences are unforeseeable and beyond China's control.

The Communist Chinese behavior in the Sino-Indian border dispute points to their desire for a limited, quick war for a specific objective. It also lends little support to the assertion—made mainly by those wishful thinkers who have periodically predicted the internal collapse of China—that the war was fought to overcome internal difficulties

(which began to diminish in the fall of 1962).

There was indeed discernible in China a general war mood, as there has been for the last 13 years, and posters on the Sino-Indian war could be seen in factories. But the war was neither preceded, nor accompanied nor followed by the whipping up of that extreme hysteria so familiar in the perennial anti-American campaign. The Cuban crisis and the conflict with the Soviet Union received more prominence than the border war. The whole propaganda approach to the war was one of righteous indignation that a fellow Asian nation should have forced China into violent hostilities and of fervent hope that Asian solidarity might be restored as quickly as possible; and that at any rate the fighting should not seriously interfere with it. If there was any real passion at all, it found expression against the Communist critics of China's action rather than India. The tone of China's propagandists was not designed to arouse mass emotions for the sake of overcoming internal dissensions and dissatisfactions.

After all this has been said, there remains the fact that China has attacked India. Yet, it must be considered possible that from China's standpoint the basic issue involved is not primarily related to India. This possibility is an important aspect of any evaluation of China's policy and what to do about it. Seen from a broader perspective, in which the Sino-Indian border war might be an episode, the situation fits into the picture of a nationalist and Communist China claiming to fear no-one, willing to go it alone, and determined to restore, as a minimum, the grandeur of a former empire, but to do so without becoming "adventurist."

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"Peking is now obviously in the process of broadening its contacts in Japan in order to force a reorientation of Japanese policy away from the United States," notes this observer. "What are the prospects . . . of Japan moving toward recognition and closer relations with Peking?"

China and Japan

By PAUL F. LANGER
The Rand Corporation

"Two fundamental problems have been left unsolved in postwar Japanese politics. One is the question of how to revise the Constitution to bring it in line with the postwar social structure. The other is the Chinese question."

"It is impossible to think about Japan divorced from the subject of Sino-Japanese relations. The fact remains unchanged through two thousand years down to this day."

THESE two statements¹ highlighting the extreme importance of China to Japan were made by men who represent two very different points of view in Japanese politics: the first is a leading figure in the conservative government party, the second is a prominent young left-wing intellectual close to the opposition Socialists. Most Japanese, whatever their differences on other matters, would agree that relations with China remain crucial for Japan.²

Why this should be so will become clearer if we examine the images these two countries have of each other and review the record of their relationship in recent years.

Japan's close historical ties with China have had a lasting effect in shaping the Japanese outlook on its continental neighbor. Even

¹ Nakasone Yasuhiro, "Japan and the China Problem," *Japan Quarterly*, July-September, 1961, and (Professor) Sakamoto Yoshikazu, "Sino-Japanese Relations in the Nuclear Era," *Sekai*, June, 1963.

² Any views expressed in this paper are those of the author. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of The RAND Corporation or the official opinion or policy of any of its governmental or private research sponsors. Papers are reproduced by The RAND Corporation as a courtesy to members of its staff.

today, when Westernization seems to have profoundly affected all aspects of Japanese life, the Japanese attitude toward China continues to be characterized by respect for the important Chinese cultural contribution to Japan's heritage; by a feeling that there exists a special relationship between the two nations; by a widely held belief that Japan understands China—and that includes Communist China—better than other nations (and especially the United States); and by the conviction that cooperation between Japan and China is an historical necessity. This affinity reflects itself in various ways, one of which is the Japanese use of the expression *dōbun dōshu* ("same script, same tribe") for referring to China.

This traditional Japanese view of China is reinforced today by considerations of a moral, political, and economic order.

Ever since emerging in the nineteenth century as a modern power, Japan has sought to expand its influence over the Chinese continent. Japan's expansionist drive reached its height during the 1930's and during the Second World War when Japanese soldiers occupied large portions of Chinese territory

and established a Chinese puppet regime. Yet the Japanese armies were never quite able to break Chinese resistance and to transform China into a satellite. This wartime experience has added to the traditional Japanese feelings of respect for China, a sense of guilt for the atrocities committed in China and a desire to atone for the past record of Japan's aggression. The guilt complex was intensified after the war by Chiang Kai-shek's generous treatment of the surrendering Japanese forces in China and by his renunciation of war claims against the former enemy. Ironically, the generosity of the Chinese Nationalist regime served also to benefit its Communist successors on the mainland.

It is understandable therefore that the Japanese are today exceedingly reluctant to take an objective or critical view of Communist China. On the whole, Peking can count on being given the benefit of the doubt in Japan, even when suppressing Tibetan independence or "correcting" the Sino-Indian border by force of arms. In a sense, Japan is morally on the defensive in dealing with China. This state of mind of course militates against the adoption by Japan of a hard political line as practiced by the United States in its China policy.

But Japan is also politically vulnerable to Chinese Communist overtures and pressures because of what one might call the persistent "China dream." Ever since Japan's emergence into world affairs, the Japanese political élite has held to the conviction that Japan's future is irrevocably linked to that of Asia and that it can be assured only through close cooperation with—or firm control over—China, Asia's greatest or potentially greatest power. Such convictions once led to the attempted creation of a Japanese-dominated Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. Today they are reflected in the dream of many Japanese about their country's "Asian mission" as a bridge between East and West; they underlie the hope of many Japanese that Japan will be instrumental in bringing China back into the family of nations, thus assuring peace in the Far East.

For the Marxist Japanese Socialists, "friend-

ship with China" is at the very heart of their concept of "positive neutralism," which they expect to substitute eventually for Japan's present alignment with the West. As to the Japanese Communists, one need not dwell on their reasons for promoting a rapprochement with Peking.

The economic factor is, of course, a major element in shaping the Japanese attitude toward China. Past Japanese schemes for a self-sufficient Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere have in the main rested on the concept of a Sino-Japanese axis, and Japan's prewar military and economic power was founded largely on the resources which Northeast China (Manchuria) provided for the resource-starved Japanese islands. Before the war, China was also far and away Japan's most important customer. Even today when the United States and Southeast Asia have supplanted China in Japan's foreign trade statistics, most Japanese feel that it would be short-sighted or even suicidal to neglect economic opportunities in China.

Such convictions are particularly strong among those business circles which have a vital interest in the China trade and which are effectively represented by an influential faction within the Liberal Democratic party. The Chinese Communist development program, it is believed, will open up eventually a potential market for Japan, especially since Japan's technologically advanced economy will continue for a long time to come to make it complementary to that of a retarded but industrializing China.

Some of the traditional features of the China image are now being eroded by the economic, political and cultural Westernization of Japanese life, by the two decades of estrangement, by the adverse impact of Chinese Communist politics, and by a number of other factors. But if the Japanese people are psychologically moving away from China, this is a slow process.

THE CHINESE IMAGE

The Chinese Communist image of Japan is less clearly discernible. Nevertheless, Peking's policies toward Japan as well as Chinese

Communist statements and literature on the subject at least point to a number of relevant conclusions.

The spectacular rise of modern Japan, in marked contrast to the deterioration of Chinese power until the advent of the Communists, has clearly enhanced Japanese prestige among the Chinese leaders and intellectuals, many of whom were trained in Japan. This is as true of the Chinese Communists as of their predecessors. Thus, Mao Tse-tung and other Chinese leaders have frequently called Japan "a great nation" and indicated that they assign a high value to the role of cooperation between the two countries.

China's historical experience with Japanese invasions in recent decades tends on the other hand to magnify Chinese fear of a revival of Japanese militarism—somewhat like Russian fear of Germany. (In both cases the issue is, of course, also a very effective propaganda instrument.) This underlying Chinese concern about a potential threat from Japan is no doubt intensified many times over by Japan's alliance with the United States, since the power of the United States to curb Chinese Communist ambitions rests to a large extent on the American military position in Japan and Okinawa and on its political and economic influence there. The Sino-Soviet military alliance of February, 1950, is therefore specifically aimed at Japan and implicitly at the United States, and there is continued Chinese concern about the possibility of the United States' using Japan as a base against China.

This Chinese perspective of Japan is further affected by the decisive role that Japan could play in determining the success or failure of Peking's attempts to attain its goal, the ousting of United States influence from the periphery of China. Japan is viewed by the Chinese Communists as an important prop for America's "moribund" capitalism, as a "vital piece on the chessboard of United States nuclear strategy" that makes possible continued United States domination over Asia. Clearly any Chinese success on the Japanese front, such as the establishment of a neutralist or less pro-American regime in Japan,

would immensely benefit the Chinese power position in the Far East and correspondingly harm that of its opponent, the United States.

As viewed from Peking, Japan is also a dangerous rival in Asia at least as long as American power backs Japan and appears to determine that country's foreign policy. Peking's principal goals and immediate opportunities relate to the area which extends from Southeast Asia north to Korea, but in this region Japan is clearly a key factor and could become a major obstacle to Chinese domination. It is understood both in China and elsewhere that Japan, backed by American power, remains the only Far Eastern nation that could compete with Communist China and provide Asia with an alternative to the Chinese way.

It is logical, therefore, that Chinese Communist policy toward Japan has aimed at three objectives: to gain a political foothold in Japan, to use this foothold in order to breach the United States-Japanese alliance, and, finally, to eliminate United States influence from Japan. The record of Chinese Communist-Japanese relations during the last decade has reflected the continuing Chinese search for effective means to attain these ends.

PEKING'S CHANGING TACTICS

During the 1950's, Communist China's tactics in dealing with Japan went through a number of stages. On the whole these have been consistent with the general Chinese policy line, but in their exact timing and in the "mix" of policy instruments applied these tactics have no doubt been strongly influenced by Peking's assessment of Japanese domestic conditions. Without going into the details of the tactical shifts in Peking's Japan policy, it seems worth stressing some points which have continued relevance.

An examination of Communist China's policy toward Japan suggests that Moscow and Peking coordinated their Japanese policies or applied similar tactics only during the first years of the Chinese People's Republic. These were of course the years in which the Sino-Soviet military alliance against Japan and the

United States was concluded. It was also the period when the Communist bloc lacked diplomatic contacts with Japan, banked heavily on the Japanese Communists, encouraged militant anti-American action and, on the whole, ignored whatever opportunities presented themselves for an improvement of relations with the conservative Japanese government.

Later on, however, Moscow began to go its own way. It abandoned its solidarity with Peking, and, in 1956, proceeded unilaterally to re-establish diplomatic relations with Japan on the basis of a compromise not available to Peking. From that moment, the two Communist powers have operated under substantially different conditions and without much reference to each other in their dealings with Japan. This has been clearly evidenced in economic matters as well as in the two powers' political approach to Japan. Short of an unlikely complete Sino-Soviet reconciliation, Peking must continue to stand on its own feet. It must build up its own position in Japan irrespective of Soviet policy. The worsening of Sino-Soviet relations during the last two years has not surprisingly been reflected in divergent policies and pulls within Japanese Communist-front organizations and in intensive efforts by Moscow and Peking directed toward winning the allegiance of the Japanese Communists.³

In its dealings with Japan, Communist China has engaged in much experimentation with "soft," and "hard," and intermediate policy lines. A major shift took place in 1958. By that time, Communist China, pursuing a gradualist policy and making use of economic incentives, had made substantial progress toward *de facto* recognition by Japan. Beginning with a private trade agreement with Japanese businessmen in the summer of 1952, Peking gradually increased the volume of trade between the two countries. In these transactions the degree of official Japanese involvement slowly increased. By 1958,

restrictions in trade with China had been reduced to the level of those applicable to Japanese trade with other Communist countries (i.e., certain restrictions pertaining only to China had been repealed), and Tokyo and Peking had agreed that permanent trade missions would soon be exchanged. The flow of Japanese visitors to China was steadily increasing and most Japanese war criminals had been repatriated by China. By 1958, Communist China had therefore established broad channels of communications with Japan and was well on the way to a status approaching *de facto* recognition.

Having reached this point, however, Peking apparently overestimated its strength. As a result of a dispute over the right of trade missions to fly their national flag, followed by an incident in which the Chinese Communist flag was desecrated by an anti-Communist Japanese youth, Peking suddenly broke off all trade relations with Japan, severed virtually all other contacts, and rebuffed official and unofficial Japanese conciliatory gestures. Obviously this was done in the expectation that economic, political, and psychological pressures would soon force the Japanese government to offer further political concessions in order to pacify Peking.

It took the Chinese Communist leaders some time to understand that their influence was as yet insufficient to effect a basic change in Japan's policy toward China. In 1959, one could detect the first signs that Peking was beginning to re-examine its tactics, but the developing Japanese mass movement against the Kishi government later that year and the political turmoil in Japan caused by the fierce struggle over the revision of the United States-Japanese security pact delayed the sobering-up process in Peking and misled the Chinese leaders into thinking that a revolutionary situation was perhaps ripening in Japan.

In response to the mass riots in Tokyo, Communist China violently attacked the Japanese government and mobilized millions in Peking and elsewhere to cheer on the "Japanese struggle of liberation from the American yoke." In 1960, the Kishi government did

³ See the author's "Independence or Subordination: The Japanese Communist Party Between Moscow and Peking" in the forthcoming *Communist Strategies in Asia*, Praeger, New York, 1963.

indeed fall, as the result of domestic pressures and internal strife within the Liberal Democratic Party (L.D.P.), but the security pact with the United States had by then been ratified. Kishi's successor, Prime Minister Ikeda, was also a conservative and appeared unwilling to reorient Japan's foreign policy.

Not surprisingly, Peking eventually decided to abandon its hard and inflexible policy line. During the past two years Communist China has been reverting to a more gradualist policy toward Japan in the hope of obtaining little by little what it was unable to gain at one stroke by the application of direct pressure.

CHINA TRADE AND "PEOPLE'S DIPLOMACY"

The Japanese government must steer a careful middle course between its American ally's reluctance to see any contacts between Tokyo and Peking and the domestic political, economic and psychological pressures which tend to encourage such contacts. In negotiating commercial contracts with Peking, Japan must avoid giving umbrage to the Chiang Kai-shek regime, with which it maintains normal diplomatic relations and which has proved so far a much better customer than Communist China. While seeking to keep channels open to both Taipeh and Peking, the Japanese government must also avoid giving the impression that it is working toward a two-China solution, since both the Nationalists and the Communists reject such a policy.

Moreover, within the ruling party itself there is disagreement over the best way to approach the China problem. Some influential figures would like to see Japan adopt an approach less hostile toward the Communist regime and less governed by considerations of United States containment policies. This, they believe, would allow Japan greater freedom to trade with all comers. In a party of loosely allied factions where the struggle for leadership is almost perpetual, controversial issues like the China question can be political dynamite.

The Liberal Democrats and the Japanese government are therefore forced to insist that the political and economic aspects of China policy can be separated. The L.D.P. plat-

form of May, 1962, for instance, contains a pledge to promote economic and cultural relations with Communist China, but is careful to state that such relations should be based on mutual respect for each other's position and on non-interference in each other's affairs. A recent incident highlighted the problems that China policy raises for the Japanese government. President Kennedy's speech of December 3, 1962, was widely interpreted in Japan as an appeal for a more active Japanese role in containing Communist China. Since this speech was reported in Tokyo only two weeks after a Japanese trade mission, with the L.D.P.'s approval, had signed in Peking the first large-scale commercial agreement between the two countries since 1958, the Socialists were in a favorable position to raise a domestic storm.

Hard pressed by the opposition and moved by public concern over further Japanese involvement in the United States strategy of containment, Premier Ikeda felt compelled to reassure everyone. In so doing, he confirmed that Japan must continue to cooperate with the free world in a spirit of anti-communism, but emphasized that trade with Communist China was an entirely separate matter.

Unfortunately for Japan this is not quite the way the problem is viewed in Washington, Taipeh, or Peking. For a number of years, the Chinese Communists have confronted Japanese negotiators with the so-called three political principles of Sino-Japanese relations: the Japanese government must not be hostile to Peking, must not pursue a "two-China plot," and must not obstruct the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations. They have also explicitly stated time and again that politics and economics are inseparable. The strict application of these principles led in 1958 to a deadlock between Tokyo and Japan and to the severance of all trade relations. Having gained little by this hard doctrine, the Chinese Communists have now turned to a new and more flexible policy. This was officially enunciated in Peking by Premier Chou En-lai in September, 1962, at the occasion of a banquet honoring an L.D.P. leader

known for his strong desire to bring about a Sino-Japanese rapprochement. The Premier suggested that the two countries adopt "gradual and cumulative methods to develop their political and economic relations."

In pursuing this new tactical line, the Peking regime has made it clear that it has not abandoned its "three political principles." Meanwhile, however, it is willing to approach the problem step by step. According to Peking's so-called three trade principles, commercial exchanges can move through three channels or stages. First, there is small-scale trade based on Chinese magnanimity toward Japanese industries that are dependent on Chinese raw materials. Second, there are private contracts which have the tacit backing of the Japanese government. Finally, there are normal trade relations which require government-to-government contacts and thus in a sense *de facto* recognition of the Peking regime.

During the past several years, Sino-Japanese trade has moved from the first stage to the second and is now preparing the ground for stage three, government-to-government relations. For a while after 1958, direct trade between the two countries was limited to such small products as Chinese lacquer

and water chestnuts; the left-wing Japanese labor federation *Sohyo* acting as intermediary. Then followed the stage when Peking and Japanese organizations sympathetic to Peking certified certain businesses as "friendly companies" and hence deserving of the privilege of trading with Communist China. By the end of 1962 their number had grown to about 200. Most of these were small firms, but among them were several ill-disguised representatives of the largest Japanese corporations whose American affiliations and trading interests made it advisable to operate through "dummies."

By the fall of 1962, Peking's attitude had softened to the point where two important Japanese conservatives could visit China for serious Sino-Japanese talks. In the talks they had the unofficial blessing of the Japanese government. The first visitor, L.D.P. leader Matsumura Kenzo (one of the most outspoken conservative advocates of a Sino-Japanese rapprochement), prepared in long cordial talks with the Chinese leaders the foundation for a new start in relations between the two countries. The visit in November, 1962, of Takasaki Tatsunosuke, a prominent businessman-politician known for his interest in Communist bloc trade, resulted in a five-year trade agreement with Peking that aims at an annual \$100 million level of exchange.⁴

That the Japanese government will be able to remain officially uninvolved in this developing trade seems questionable since Communist China is already pressing for deferred payments, which would require government consent.⁵ There is also the issue of what items should be excluded from export to China in line with the free world's policy of preventing the Communist bloc from obtaining strategic goods. The Japanese government has recently given indications that it wishes to trade with China on at least as liberal a basis as does Western Europe. This would seem to provide the Chinese Communists with additional leverage when they proceed to work toward increasing official Japanese involvement with the Peking regime as a step toward diplomatic recognition.

⁴ Total Japanese trade with the Communist bloc amounted to \$320 million in 1961 and \$440 million in 1962. This represented about 3 per cent and 4.2 per cent respectively of total Japanese foreign trade. Up to 1958, trade with Communist China formed the bulk of exchanges with the Communist bloc. The Chinese share drastically declined in 1958 and 1959 due to the Chinese cancellation of the fourth Sino-Soviet trade agreement. Japanese-Chinese trade increased somewhat in 1961 as a result of Chinese relaxation of pressure. In 1962, Sino-Japanese trade recovered substantially attaining the \$85 million level. Even if Sino-Japanese trade reaches the annual level of \$100 million as envisaged in the Takasaki agreement, it will constitute only about 1 per cent of total Japanese foreign trade whereas the United States share in Japan's foreign trade amounts to about 30 per cent.

⁵ The grant of deferred payments would raise important problems for Japan. Peking has, for example, requested that its planned purchases of fertilizer be placed on a deferred payment basis. However, no such treatment is presently accorded Taiwan and South Korea which are strongly anti-Communist and take about 80 per cent of Japan's fertilizer exports. These governments would of course strenuously object to such preferential treatment for Peking.

The developing trade with Japan has not prevented Communist China from encouraging Japanese opposition to the Ikeda government's foreign policies. As a long-range proposition Peking continues no doubt to seek the removal of United States influence, but in line with Chou En-lai's "cumulative" approach the Chinese effort concentrates now on more limited goals. Communist China has thus vociferously urged the Socialists and Communists to oppose any Japanese-South Korean rapprochement, which Peking fears would bring Japan out of its military isolationism and might eventually lead to a United States-sponsored "Northeast Asian Alliance." At the same time, Peking has sought to reduce the military value of Japan to the United States by abetting Japanese resistance to United States bases in Okinawa and Japan, and by launching propaganda campaigns against the United States proposal to dock nuclear-propelled (not nuclear-armed) submarines in Japan as well as against any other measures that might strengthen the United States military position.

In these attempts the Chinese Communists can generally count on Japanese Communist and Socialist support. The Socialist party, however slowly it is moving away from Marxist orthodoxy and radicalism, finds it difficult to withhold its support of any power that claims to be Socialist. Furthermore, its leaders themselves are considerably disadvantaged by a commitment made back in 1959 when they joined Peking in labeling the United States the "common enemy." The Chinese Communists have thus compelled subsequent Japanese Socialist missions to reconfirm this view, despite Socialist attempts to disavow it.

Since restoring unofficial contacts, the Peking regime has also greatly expanded its cultural relations with Japan. Any Japanese individual or group calling itself "progressive" has been welcome in Peking. Japanese Communist delegations have been frequent visitors to the Chinese capital in the past year and so have a great many front organizations like the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. But Peking has also played host to trade union

delegations (especially when these represented areas where the anti-United States base movement is active), to artistic and scientific missions, and to a variety of prominent Japanese ranging from leaders of the anti-nuclear movement to medical doctors or Buddhist priests. In exchange Peking has sent its own envoys, including a 6-member delegation of the Association for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, Chinese acrobats, jugglers, and magicians among others.

FUTURE RELATIONS

Peking is now obviously in the process of broadening its contacts in Japan in order to force a reorientation of Japanese policy away from the United States. What are the prospects then of Japan moving toward recognition and closer relations with Peking?

If the Socialists come to power, Peking's success seems assured because even today they insist that United States containment policies are the principal cause of tension in the Far East. But a Socialist victory in the foreseeable future is unlikely.

Short of a complete change in the balance of power in Asia, the Peking regime will therefore be compelled to deal with a conservative government operating within the environment created by Japan's adherence to the American alliance. At least as long as Peking remains a non-nuclear power, Chinese Communist successes in Japan are likely to be of limited scope and significance.

(Continued on page 181)

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This specialist reports that the Chinese Communist offensive in Southeast Asia has succeeded in "wresting control from Moscow." During the last year, "... the Chinese People's Republic seems to have gained some ascendancy throughout Southeast Asia. ..."

Peking Strikes South

BY BERNARD B. FALL

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IN AN EARLIER article on Chinese operations in Southeast Asia, written in June, 1962, and published in *Current History* (September, 1962), I stated that "right at this moment, India . . . will no doubt have to pay the price of her mistakes with large tracts of her borderlands." The first serious clashes between Red Chinese and Indian troops in the Ladakh area began on September 8, 1962. By October 20, they had, on the Chinese side, jelled into a massive and concerted offensive particularly in the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) area. Within a few days, India's armed forces in the area had literally disintegrated and only a miracle seemingly could stop the Chinese from doing in a few days what the Japanese failed to do in three years during World War II: occupy all of Assam and force open the gates to India's defenseless plains.

The defeat of the Indian armies exploded what was probably the most cherished military myth since the French military in 1940 tried to beat Hitler's Panzer Divisions with World War I cannon and tactics. In both cases, a slim façade of regulars hid an assemblage of ill-armed, ill-trained and ill-equipped forces incapable physically as well as morally of withstanding the onslaught of well-trained and hostile forces. Indian troops, including some of their senior officers, were taken prisoner or killed by the thousands; as of June, 1963, the Chinese were still repatriat-

ing the prisoners by deliberate trickles. And in Delhi, Prime Minister Nehru had to offer up for political sacrifice his closest associate and, until then, most likely successor, Defense Minister Krishna Menon.

On November 21, 1962, as suddenly as it had started, Red China's offensive stopped. Peking offered a unilateral cease-fire in the course of which it withdrew the "Border Guards" allegedly involved in the offensive to the line of Chinese territorial demands; thus China added to India's military defeat a measure of diplomatic humiliation that is likely to be remembered for a long time. But India had no choice: after a few weeks of sparring, the Chinese terms were accepted as offered.

Thus, Red China settled one important element of her historical territorial claims. Subsequent negotiations with anti-Communist Pakistan found the latter highly amenable to a friendly settlement of the border between Pak-held Kashmir and Chinese Sinkiang, the more so because China was willing to recognize Pakistan's claims of control in an area which India had claimed for herself. That negotiation, along with those which settled the Sino-Burmese border in January, 1961, completed the political isolation of India from her immediate neighbors and further sapped India's position in Southeast Asia. By ricochet, as will be seen later, India's weakening also weakened the Soviet

Union's influence in Southeast Asia. After years of comparative eclipse, the Chinese People's Republic returned in full strength to politics south of her border.

TACTICS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Chinese policies in Southeast Asia during 1962-1963 ran along two tracks: on the one hand, consolidating Chinese control over the Communist movements in the area and showing the non-committed governments of the area that it was the C.P.R. and not the Soviet Union which was the principal factor of power; on the other hand, demonstrating to those Communist forces actively engaged in supporting anti-American insurgent movements that the C.P.R. could "deliver" on promises of active help to a quantitative and political extent that the U.S.S.R. could not or would not, in view of her worldwide commitments. The approach of the two major Communist powers to this aspect of policy came clearly to the fore when Khrushchev, nettled by Chinese accusations that he was afraid of the American "paper tiger," bluntly replied, "But that tiger has nuclear teeth."

Actual rivalry between the U.S.S.R. and the C.P.R. in Southeast Asia took the form of competitive visits of high Russian and Chinese dignitaries to the uncommitted countries and to North Vietnam. Late in 1962, the Russian Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Pact Forces, General Batov, visited Hanoi and had long talks with the North Vietnamese leaders. His visit was followed by that of Czechoslovakia's President Novotny (who also visited Cambodia), a Soviet legislative delegation, and some minor Polish and East German delegations. Field Marshal Malinovsky paid an extended courtesy visit to Indonesia, underlining heavily the importance of Soviet military equipment in Indonesia's successful campaign to gain control of New Guinea and to defend herself against other "imperialist" encroachments.

However, such Russian visits of compara-

tively second-ranking officials—whose largely military character may also come as a surprise—were clearly overshadowed by the visits made to Indonesia, Cambodia and North Vietnam by Liu Shao-chi, the President of the Chinese People's Republic, accompanied by a vast retinue of senior Chinese officials. At Djakarta, President Sukarno greeted Liu as a "comrade-in-arms in the struggle against imperialism and colonialism."¹ In neighboring Cambodia, where the C.P.R. operates a fairly sizeable aid program, some of whose projects have run into production troubles,² Liu signed a joint statement with the Chief of State, Prince Sihanouk, on May 6, 1963. That statement emphasized continued peaceful coexistence, Chinese recognition of Cambodia's territorial integrity (threatened by South Vietnamese claims to two small islands in the Gulf of Siam), and "deep anxiety concerning the worsening situation in Laos." Cambodia, in turn, supported China's stand with regard to her admission to the United Nations and her claims to Taiwan. With regard to the Sino-Indian border dispute, Cambodia took a more nuanced attitude: Prince Sihanouk expressed the hope that it would be settled by direct negotiations and expressed the view that "all international disputes should be settled fairly and reasonably by peaceful means."³

But it was in North Vietnam that Liu's visit took on particular importance. For the past eight years, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (D.R.V.N.) had maintained an attitude of strict noncommittal in the increasingly acrimonious Sino-Soviet dispute. Throughout his long life as a revolutionary, Ho Chi Minh had shied away from political polemics.⁴ At the recent congresses of the C.P.S.U. and the 1963 congress of the East German Unity party, he succeeded in keeping his own party out of a decisive commitment to either side. Yet it became increasingly obvious that pressures would build up inside North Vietnam to throw the allegiance of the D.R.V.N. entirely to the Chinese side.

After all, as seen from Hanoi, the Russian record of support had not been overly impressive: the joint Soviet-D.R.V.N. operation

¹ *Washington Post*, April 13, 1963.

² *Ibid.*, May 4, 1963.

³ *Cambodia News*, Washington, May 14, 1963.

⁴ Cf. Fall, *Le Viet-Minh, 1946-1960* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1960), p. 25.

in Laos in 1961–1962 had again left Hanoi with a long flanking border dangling in mid-air and had not been very generous in terms of equipment. The operation had also shown how vulnerable Russian support really was if it did not, in turn, enjoy Red Chinese support. Russian equipment was largely brought to North Vietnamese ports via an extremely long sealift, totally vulnerable to a Cuba-like “quarantine” by the United States Seventh Fleet. The American-built Chinese airports in Yunnan cannot be interdicted in a similar manner.

Throughout their stay in the D.R.V.N., Liu and Marshal Chen-I, the Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister of the C.P.R., drove home the theme that China could do much for North Vietnam that a timorous Soviet Union led by Khrushchev would not do. Much emphasis was placed upon the long history of cooperation and shoulder-to-shoulder fighting of Chinese and Vietnamese Communists. In his improvised address before the students of the Hanoi National Minorities School, Chen-I underlined that the D.R.V.N. “is standing in the frontline of the Southeast Asian region, and China is the rear [area]. The frontline defends the rear, and the rear supports the frontline; that characterizes the relations between our two countries in the current struggle.”⁵

And in his address before the assembled people of Hanoi, Liu once more presented the Peking viewpoint with great force:

... the foreign policy of socialist countries must not be reduced to the single aspect of peaceful coexistence. . . . It must not be reinterpreted at will, or stretched to apply to relations between the oppressed and oppressor nations. Peaceful coexistence must not be used to abolish the socialist countries’ duty of supporting the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed nations and people. The foreign policy of socialist countries, all the more, must not be used to supersede the revolutionary line of the proletariat of various countries and their parties.⁶

⁵ Viet-Nam News Agency, *News Bulletin* [VNA], Hanoi, May 15, 1963.

⁶ New China News Agency, *News Bulletin* [NCNA], Peking, May 18, 1963.

⁷ Klaus Mehnert, *Peking und Moskau* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1962), p. 546.


Yet the joint statement signed by Liu and Ho Chi Minh on May 16, while rehashing much of the standard Peking line, also contains a cautionary clause which clearly denotes Ho’s own fine hand: “While combating revisionism, it is also necessary to combat dogmatism.” Dogmatism, of course, is the political sin of which Red China is accused because she insists on her own interpretation of the Marxist-Leninist dogma.

NEW MOVES IN LAOS

Professor Klaus Mehnert, West Germany’s foremost expert on the Soviet bloc (who recently had spent several years traveling in Russia and China), felt that, over-all, “the interim score in the spring of 1962 was 5–1 in favor of Moscow,”⁷ in Southeast Asia. Yet it seems one year later that the score has more than evened in favor of Peking.

In Laos, the precariously put-together July, 1962, Geneva cease-fire brought about the establishment of a “tripartite” coalition government under Prince Souvanna Phouma. While the new Lao government supposedly had the support of all three factions, it never succeeded in controlling much more than the area the neutralist forces occupied at the time of the cease-fire, plus the capital city of Vientiane. The key problem of reducing the factions’ armed forces to three groups of 10,000 men each immediately ran into trouble as the Right-wing forces of General Phoumi were faced with a reduction of almost 60,000 men, while the Communists and neutral forces would remain almost at full strength.

Also, not one of the three factions (although this was, of course, denied on all sides) could or would fully carry out the provision dealing with the withdrawal of “foreign” military forces and advisers except for the French advisory group permitted under the Geneva agreements of 1962. While all American official military advisers left before the October, 1962, target date, the D.R.V.N. only withdrew about 40 of her estimated total of over 10,000 troops in the Pathet Lao zones of Laos. Both sides immediately began to level charges against the



Map Taken From a History Manual Published in Peking in 1954

- — — China's border in 1840 at the time of the Opium War.
— · — · — China's border at the end of the Early Democratic Revolution period (1919)

[Author's Note: the 1919 boundaries, as shown here, include the Mongolian Republic and the Republic of Tannu-Tuva.]

other, to the effect that the cease-fire provisions were being violated.

Since the bulk of the North Vietnamese troops were drawn from the 335th Infantry Division, composed of Thai mountaineers

who speak exactly the same dialect as the Black Thai tribesmen of Laos, it is obviously impossible for anyone to tell the difference between a peaceable, Lao-Thai tribesman and his more warlike North Vietnamese tribal

brother. The Pathet Lao, on the other hand, charge (and the fact is verified) that the Meo tribesmen who were trained and equipped last year by American Special Forces teams, continue to shell the Pathet Lao held city of Xieng-Khouang with mortar and machine-gun fire. They also charge that certain Filipino and Thailand Special Forces instructors, whose Asian physique permits them to blend in with the Laotians, have remained behind in Laos and continue to operate with the Right-wing forces. While the latter allegation is being denied in official quarters, it is admitted that the Meo tribesmen are involved in military incidents, but in "self-defense." Thus, even without any additional Red Chinese incentives, the Lao situation has all the tinder for yet another conflagration.

In the meantime, however, the C.P.R. began to anchor itself in northeastern Laos—on the ground, where it counts; and not in Vientiane, where the Laotians and the diplomats accredited there continue to play at make-believe politics. A large coolie force—the magical figure of 10,000 is being used⁸—already has completed the first leg of a permanent motor road to Phongsaly; another road allegedly links Muong Sing to the Chinese road net, and both roads are eventually to link up with Road 7 of the French-built Lao road net. Road 7 crosses northern Laos east to west and connects the area, via the vital *Plaine des Jarres*, with the North Vietnamese road net.

In the early spring of 1963, a series of political murders involving extreme Leftist-leaning elements of the neutralist faction was followed by fairly severe fighting on the *Plaine des Jarres*. As usual in Laos, the

exact facts were hard to come by, but the key anti-neutralist elements involved in the fighting seemed to be not Pathet Lao, but dissident neutralists under the command of a "Colonel" Deuane. It is here that some Western observers began to feel that the U.S.S.R. might well have lost operational control over the Communist forces in Laos (assuming that anyone ever has full operational control over *anything* in Laos), for several joint appeals made by the Russian and British chairmen of the Geneva conference failed to effect an end to the fighting.

Private appeals by Russian diplomats also seemed to have failed at that juncture;⁹ and in May, 1963, the Soviet Union began to pull out of Laos the pilots and maintenance personnel it had put at the disposal of the Lao government, leaving Russian airplanes which soon would lose all usefulness without spare parts and proper maintenance. This was interpreted as an open acknowledgement on the part of the Russians that they were unable to maintain control over the situation and preferred to withdraw their personnel rather than see it involved in situations in which Chinese-donated anti-aircraft artillery would shoot at Soviet-manned aircraft. This possibility is not so far-fetched as it might seem: on May 3, 1963, two French-piloted helicopters were shot down at the *Plaine des Jarres* in full daylight, while picking up a French soldier who had been badly injured by a Communist mine blast earlier.

On May 30, another joint appeal by the two chairmen of the Geneva cease-fire asked all Laotian parties to cease fighting, but the over-all situation leaves little room for optimism. In addition, inaccurate alarmist reports, put out by Laotian officialdom far from the scene,¹⁰ hardly contribute to a clear evaluation as to how far the C.P.R. has succeeded in wresting control from Moscow of the Communist side in the Laos conflict. The answer may well be found in Hanoi.

The deterioration of the situation in Laos has also influenced neighboring Thailand. Over the past year, there was a marked increase of Communist Vietnamese and even Pathet Lao infiltration on the impoverished

⁸ *Washington Post*, April 13, 1963. The figure "10,000" which one often finds in such news seems to be derived from the Chinese habit of describing "many" by saying "ten thousand." This, then, is taken literally by the Western observer.

⁹ *The New York Times*, April 30, 1963.

¹⁰ The Lao ambassador in Bangkok was quoted by the *Washington Post* of April 13, 1963, to the effect that "Chinese troops had occupied Muong Sing." That same ambassador, on May 14, 1962, had announced that Pathet Lao rebels had severely attacked Ban Houei Sai on the Thai border. No Red soldier was within 30 miles of that city. Cf. Fall, "Laos—Who Broke the Cease-Fire?" *New Republic*, June 18, 1962.

Korat plateau of northeastern Thailand and among the minority tribes abutting on the Burmese Shan States.

Thailand, so far, limits its counter-insurgency operations to the fly-swatting method. Communist suspects are often sent to the firing squad before they are properly interrogated. Too little emphasis is placed on finding socio-economic and political remedies that will diminish the spread of Communist influence in northeastern Thailand. Another problem is the very large Chinese community, largely concentrated around Bangkok. It is probably the best-studied Chinese community in Asia, and what is known of it leads observers to believe that it provides a fair amount of support for the C.P.R. Professor G. William Skinner of Cornell University, who for several years studied the Chinese community in Thailand, concluded in one of his masterful studies that

at the very least it is clear that in the Chinese leadership corps of Bangkok political conservatism is in no way associated with greater wealth . . . only 22 per cent of the ardently pro-KMT leaders fall in the top two wealthy classes as against 38 per cent of the more leftist leaders. . . .¹¹

In the Thai-Malayan border area, a certain resurgence of guerrilla activity was reported both by Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur,¹² although some American observers on the spot tend to discount the reality of the danger. "In Malaya," said one source, "the imaginary part of the story is played up while there is no real danger at all, but in Thailand the real part of the story is played down while real danger exists."

There seems to be some evidence, however, that since the abortive Brunei rebellion of December, 1962, the illegal Malayan Communist party has sought to exploit the Malaysia issue.¹³ In May, 1963, British security forces in Sarawak found documentary evidence showing Chinese Communist influence in incidents there. The Chinese mainland

press accorded its full support to the new rebel movement and branded Malaysia as an "imperialist design," but there was no evidence of direct C.P.R. intervention.

VIETNAM IN THE BALANCE

Much of the fate of Vietnam on both sides of the seventeenth parallel hinges on the struggle for preeminence which has been going on in Hanoi between pro-Russian and pro-Chinese sympathizers for over two years; the South Vietnamese press follows with great attention all events involving Red China and Vietnam. Much of what is being printed in Saigon is, unfortunately, so completely inaccurate as to be worthless as "information." But it shows at least the propaganda trends in Saigon, when China is involved.

Thus, on October 16, 1962, *Saigon Moi* [*New Saigon*] reported that Indian troops had begun a "vast offensive" and crossed the MacMahon line, while *Thoi-Bao* [*Capital News*] spoke of Indian paratroops being dropped into Tibet. On November 7, while the decimated Indian troops were fleeing to the rear, *Bao-Moi* [*New Journal*] reported in screaming 4-inch letters across its front page that the Indian forces were using "flame-throwers, atomic grenades [sic] and poison gas in the battle for Tibet."

The press, at the same time, was equally detailed but hardly more accurate in reporting the comings and goings in Peking of leaders of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (N.L.F.S.V.). According to *Dan Moi* [*New People*] of October 5, a North Vietnamese emissary brought instructions to Liberation Front leaders then in Peking, who later, supposedly returned to their hideouts inside South Vietnam. Other Saigon press news of that period announced that General Giap and other senior North Vietnamese commanders were inside South Vietnam. The purpose of spreading such misinformation among the South Vietnamese populace cannot be clearly fathomed, for it merely emphasizes that the local insurgent movement has extremely powerful outside backers whom all Vietnamese have good reasons to fear.

In actual fact, it is extremely hard to tell

¹¹ G. William Skinner, *Leadership and Power in the Chinese Community in Thailand*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1959), pp. 297-298.

¹² *The New York Times*, September 26, 1962. and *Washington Post*, March 25, 1963.

¹³ *Washington Post*, December 17, 1962.

from the outside (and even from the inside, as this writer found when he was in Hanoi in July, 1962) whether or not between 1962 and 1963 Red China has really succeeded in imposing its will upon the Viet Minh leaders in Hanoi. Edgar Snow, in his huge *The Other Side of the River* (whose chapter on Vietnam is literally studded with factual mistakes), feels that Ho has made his final choice and lives with it:

For five years [1953–1958] Ho Chi Minh had balanced himself between Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence" strategy and Mao's more militant approach, which better fitted Ho's aspirations but not his means. In 1958, Ho adopted Mao's line by lending all his political prestige and leadership to the overthrow of Diem's regime. . . . At the same time he observed discreet limits; in obeisance to Khrushchev's line. . . . [p. 707]

Somehow, that view oversimplifies the actions of Hanoi. If Hanoi were *really* sold on the Chinese approach to the whole problem, it would simply throw all caution to the winds, accept the theory that the 15,000 Americans in South Vietnam are "paper tigers," and throw the weight of its 14 battle-tested divisions into the struggle—not to speak of what a Red China supposedly eager to meet the Americans head on could throw into the fight. That was most definitely not my view of the situation which prevailed in Hanoi last year—and little has happened in the interval to change my estimate of the situation.

In the several interviews given by North Vietnamese leaders to Westerners in recent months, it became abundantly clear that they were aware that an "escalation" of the South Vietnamese struggle with C.P.R. help could bring about incalculable consequences for the D.R.V.N. The North Vietnamese leaders—having been to North Korea—have a keen appreciation of the military capabilities of the United States; and the Chinese reassurance that, in case of an American retaliatory air strike, Chinese aircraft would be on the scene "soon," or even immediately, holds little weight in North Vietnamese plans. Ho Chi Minh and his associates have not fought for their cause and country for 30

years and harnessed their population for eight years to a backbreaking industrialization program, to see their lifework reduced to rubble while Americans and Chinese prove to each other on Vietnamese soil that they are not "paper tigers."

There is little evidence in Ho's past to show that he is close to the "militant approach" of Mao, as Snow indicates, but there is much to show that he believes in the more gradual solution of protracted war. Yet he knows very well that North Vietnam, unlike Albania, does not have a protective belt of uninvolved nations around itself and that it cannot expect (and this may be a fault of the West rather than Ho's) much leeway on the Western side to keep it in the Russian rather than the Red Chinese camp. In a television program on February 11, 1963, Under Secretary W. Averell Harriman succinctly summed up the situation in the following words:

. . . it looks as though Ho Chi Minh is trying to play both ends against the middle. He wants to get Russian support; the Viet Minh do not wish to have the Chinese overrun them. You might say their hearts are in Moscow, but their stomachs are in China.

On the whole, the Chinese People's Republic seems to have gained some ascendancy throughout Southeast Asia since September, 1962. The brutally efficient defeat of India, China's unrepentant attitude towards Moscow, and the apparent easing-out of the latter from Laos have not been ignored among the small and badly-defended nations of Southeast Asia as portents of things to come. But what makes Red China's successes in 1962–1963 so remarkable is that they were not won against the West, but against her own Soviet ally.

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"... the Chinese Communists, by applying the 'Marxist-Leninist theory of uninterrupted revolution and the development of revolution by stages,' think they have pushed through more 'stages' of their revolution or accomplished more revolutions faster and with greater success than any other 'fraternal party.'" The Chinese Communists seem to this specialist to be traveling a "Chinese road."

The Roots of Chinese Ideology

By SHEN-YU DAI

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WHEN this writer first examined Chinese Communist ideology in this journal, he concluded that "With room for unpredictable developments of Chinese communism as an ideology and as an economic and political system, the long-range prospects clearly favor deviation both domestically and internationally." The "blooming" and "contending" campaign—one that appeared "revisionist" itself to many—and the "anti-revisionist" drive immediately thereafter culminated in the rough-going but audacious "Great Leap Forward," the People's Commune movement and the open challenge to the Soviet Union today. The resultant degree of domestic and international deviation has become startling even to this writer.

The question has been raised whether there is anything "Chinese" in Peking's communism and thus more or less "different" from its counterpart in Moscow, or whether there is any such concept as a "Chinese communism." In what sense could it be said that there has

been a Chinese road traveled by the Chinese revolutionaries? In what respects was the road followed by the Chinese Communist Party different from that of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union? What ideological enlightenment has resulted from such difference in experience? Apart from the "masses," do Chinese leaders see eye to eye with Russian leaders as to the common Communist ideology they are supposedly following?

Some new facts and new interpretations have come to light in the past few years. The stress on the revolutionary inspiration of the Chinese Communist movement, for instance, is no longer laid single-mindedly on the October Revolution and the May Fourth Movement. Additional attention has been directed, externally, at the First Communist Manifesto and the Paris Commune as the common anchorage of Communist history.¹ Internally, the T'ai-p'ing revolution (1850–1864) at roughly the same juncture has been given an unusual billing among other "peasant uprisings" in the re-examination of Chinese history.² And the beginnings of China's own "proletarian" movement are now also regularly commemorated throughout the country. What is more, the otherwise "bourgeois-national" category of historical events in China vis-a-vis foreign imperialism—a kind of experience which the Russians lacked, such

¹ See, for instance, Chiang Chun-fang, "The May 4 Movement and the Dissemination of Marxism-Leninism in China," SCMP, No. 2021. Cf. Soong Ching-ling, "China's Liberation—Sino-Soviet Friendship—Man's Great Leap into the Future," *Ten Glorious Years*, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1960.

² See the frequent reports in SCMP, Nos. 1329, 1437, 1474, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2434, 2507, 2533, 2823, and so on.

as the Opium War, the Boxer Rebellion, the Sino-French War, the Tsinan Incident (versus Japan), as well as the Nationalist Revolution, and occasions of martyrdom for certain members of the Kuomintang and of the various "democratic parties" under the Kuomintang during that period of sustained "bourgeois-national" revolution—is now also accepted as a part of the national legacy (with a slant generally against the West, including czarist Russia).

With regard to the history of the C. C. P. itself, the Chinese Communists now have even more to say. No less than Liu Shao-ch'i himself, heir apparent to Mao's mantle, has recently (August, 1962) declared that the Party "did not drop from the heavens but was born out of Chinese society." "Every member of our Party," said he, "came from Chinese society and is still living in this society today." At the present juncture of its development, he somehow sees a need for "preserving our *purity* as the proletarian vanguard."³ "The victories scored" in contemporary China, consequently, are said to "have all been achieved under the leadership" of the Party itself, "headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung," and "under the guidance of Mao Tse-tung's thinking which integrates the universal truths of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution."⁴ These have thus been termed "sovereign" victories.

"Sovereignty," naturally, leads to independent thinking and action. Hence not only is the Party leader credited with "creativity," but Party members, likewise, are called upon

to display fully their "creative ability," because their cause is said to be "one of great originality."⁵ The Chinese people at large, too, are said to have been enabled to manifest their "great creative capacity" by the Maoist system. Thus both the Party and the people today look back at the Communist revolutionary movement and its successes with pride. A drive has been going on for some time to encourage the writing of "remiscences" and local histories—down to the village level in some instances—by all, but especially meritorious Party veterans and non-Party observers, and also to carry out on-the-spot inculcation of new recruits with the Party's own "glorious traditions." Young faithfuls are today exhorted "not to forget class sufferings and national sufferings."

REINFORCEMENT OF TRADITION

Mao Tse-tung himself said: "We must make a summing-up from Confucius down to Sun Yat-sen and inherit this precious legacy." This, in fact, led to the study not only of Confucianism, but of Taoism, Buddhism and other traditions in the old Chinese culture and society. Confucius himself was rediscovered to have actually dealt with "primitive communism" and "a *kung-hsiang* (fantasy) socialism." Confucian classics have been re-studied and often used to illustrate "historical materialism" and "socialist realism," and this practice, it is said, has led to the existence of "a relatively pro-Confucius wing of Communist opinion" in China today.

Confucius, as a result, has been "redeemed" as the embodiment of traditional China's "national essence," "nationalized," and put back "in."⁶ Confucian relics are now "repaired and restored."⁷ And for the scholarly devotion, learning, "scientific" spirit and "progressive significance and purpose" of his philosophy, the name of Confucius, it is now said, "will always be respected and cherished by the Chinese people."⁸ This is a far cry from the days when Confucian classics were taken off the school curriculum and Confucius was single-mindedly denounced as an upholder of oppressive feudal authorities and a reservoir of wholly backward ideas.

In philosophical Taoism, students in Com-

³ *Ibid.*, No. 2794; italics added.

⁴ According to Lu Ting-yi, "Unite under Lenin's Revolutionary Banner," *Long Live Leninism*, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1960, p. 97. Assistance of the C.P.S.U. is relegated into the background together with that provided by relevant elements of "all countries."

⁵ See Chou Pang-chia, et al, "Why Does the New Constitution of the Party Stipulate Creativity as One of the Rights of Party Members?" *ECMM*, No. 94.

⁶ See Joseph R. Levenson, "The Place of Confucius in Communist China," *The China Quarterly*, October-December 1962.

⁷ See "China Protects Confucian Relics," *SCMP*, No. 2498.

⁸ Feng Yu-lan, "Problems in the Study of Confucius," *People's China*, No. 1, January, 1957.

munist China have now discovered "materialism." Religious Taoists, shorn of what seemed initially to be their "reactionary cults," are now rehabilitated, as are Buddhists. Taoist and Buddhist relics are likewise "repaired and restored." Followers of both religions, having "surrendered their hearts to the Party," are gainfully employed in the international as well as domestic enterprises of socialist transformation, socialist construction, cultural propaganda and diplomacy. Elements "compatible with the official ideology" are discovered in Taoist and Buddhist philosophies and historical movements. While it is now seen to be "possible" to "exemplify the concept of class struggle" in "the interpretation of the origins and original messages of Taoism," Buddhism is found to represent "a democratic, atheistic and dialectical revolt by the Kshatriya [i.e., "worker and peasant"] caste against Brahmin domination" at the time of its origination in the Indian area.⁹

Other aspects of the traditional Chinese culture and society have also been explored and exploited. The philosophy of Mo Tzu, for instance, has been singled out for praise for its basic sympathy with "the people." And the Peking regime is also observed to have shown "a stung reaction to allegation of 'Legalism' [i.e., another major school of traditional Chinese philosophy]—the hostile way of identifying the Party with the past"—by turning to praise of Confucianism. Islam as a religion also received treatment similar to that accorded Buddhism.¹⁰

Ancient books, in general, have become "treasures," specifically collected, preserved and, in some cases, reprinted. All "cultural relics"—beginning with the imperial palaces in Peking at the time of General Fu Tso-yi's

surrender in early 1949, and culminating in the tombs of the legendary Yellow Emperor, Genghis Khan, and other oldtime rulers—have been subject to "special protection" and "repair and restoration" to their "former grandeur." Along with this, archaeological studies and activities have been promoted and results announced with enthusiasm and pride.

National heroes such as Yüeh Fei, literati such as Ch'ü Yüan and Tu Fu (i.e., friends of the ordinary and oppressed), scientists such as Ts'ai Lun (the paper inventor), explorers such as Hui Shen (the "discoverer of America" in the fifth century A. D.) and Cheng Ch'eng-kung (seventeenth century founder of Taiwan), scholars such as Chang T'ai-yen and revolutionary reformers such as T'an Ssu-t'ung (of the Manchu-Republican transitional period), and Sun Yat-sen and other Nationalist and Communist martyrs have all been resurrected for glorification and, of course, utilization on appropriate occasions.

National customs such as the Dragon Boat Festival and Ch'ing Ming Festival (honoring the dead) have likewise been revived. National arts and crafts have been given a hearty, sustained boost. When, in 1958, Peking ushered in the New Year by ringing "ancient bells," old China, on the surface, seemed to have become alive again.

CHINESE UNDERSTANDING

Through the Chinese language, in particular, the Chinese understanding of communism, dialectical materialism and Marxism-Leninism tends to have a coloration of its own. Is *kung-ch'an chu-yi*, for instance, the same as "communism," and *wu-ch'an chieh-chi* the same as "the proletariat"? Decidedly not. "Share-property-ism" certainly is not equivalent to communism, nor "non-property class" to "proletariat." Would it have made no difference to their followers were the C. C. P. leaders non-Chinese? All "Party veterans," who occupy the crucial positions of executing Communist policies, and who "permeate Chinese Communist society," are said to have been responsible for "subtly transforming the decisions and directives of the

⁹ For Taoism, see Feng Yu-lan, "Two Questions about the Philosophy of Lao Tzu," SCMP, No. 2048; James E. Garvey, *Marxist-Leninist China*, New York, Exposition Press, 1960, p. 317; cf. relevant reports in SCMP, Nos. 628, 892, 934, 1424, 1509, 1512, etc. For Buddhism, see Holmes Welch, "Buddhism under the Communists," *The China Quarterly*, April-June 1961; cf. relevant reports in SCMP, Nos. 585, 1035, 1404, 1699, 1732.

¹⁰ See China Islamis Association, *Moslems in China*, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1953; cf. relevant reports in SCMP, No. 672.

top leadership, and leaving the imprint of their collective personality on the life of the ordinary people of China."¹¹ This "collective personality" must of necessity be "sectarian" (i.e., Chinese or even local) in character. Even if Peking's top leaders understood and practiced communism in its "orthodox" (i.e., German, British, or Russian?) sense in their policy-making process, what the 98 per cent of China's teeming non-Party millions understood, witnessed and went through most of the time was "Chinese communism" (*Chung-kuo kung-ch'an chu-yi*).

Mao and his Party and their reformist and revolutionary predecessors K'ang Yu-wei and Sun Yat-sen Sinicized communism, working

¹¹ Mu Fu-sheng, *The Wilting of the Hundred Flowers: Free Thought in China Today*, London, Heinemann, 1962, as analyzed by Howard L. Boorman, in a paper entitled "How to Be a Good Communist: The Political Ethics of Liu Shao-ch'i," presented before the Columbia University Seminar on Modern East Asia: China, on December 5, 1962.

¹² See Shen-Yu Dai, "Socialism and Ta T'ung: Expectations and Aspirations of Humanity," *Mao Tse-tung and Confucianism*, Ann Arbor, Mich., University Microfilms, 1953; and Shao Chuan Leng & Norman D. Palmer, *Sun Yat-sen and Communism*, New York, Praeger, 1960, especially portions on Sun's Third Principle.

¹³ See Liu Shao-ch'i, "The Victory of Marxism-Leninism in China," and Wang Chia-hsiang, "The International Significance of the Chinese People's Victory," both in *Ten Glorious Years*, pp. 1, 280. Cf. Lu Ting-yi, "The World Significance of the Chinese Revolution," *People's China*, July 1, 1951, p. 10.

¹⁴ When this writer first observed this development in late 1958, the editor removed the part on Latin America and left only Asia and Africa (see his article "Peking's International Position and the Cold War" in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, January, 1959, concluding paragraph). This prompted him to do another wholly detailed study on Latin America alone, which was presented at the annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies in Chicago, March, 1961, and also published under the editorial title "Sugar-Coated Bullets" for Latin America," in *Current Scene*, December 23, 1961.

¹⁵ See "Reply to the Chinese Party's Negotiation Proposals" and "Ponomarev's Report at Lenin Anniversary Meeting," in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, May 1 and 15, 1963, respectively. Cf. Wang Chia-hsiang, *op. cit.*, p. 281 for Peking's sample remarks. Cf. also a report that Russians were "grieved at being seen as whites rather than Marxists" and hence "suffered defeats" at the African-Asian Solidarity Conference in Moshi, Tanganyika, in *The New York Times*, June 2, 1963. See also Edgar Snow, *The Other Side of the River*, N. Y., Random House, p. 148.

with and among the Chinese people in the Chinese historical, cultural and geographical continuum.¹²

CHINESE CONTRIBUTION

What did all this mean to the world Communist movement and to communism in general? The Chinese Communists do not just look inward. They are proud and assertive also in the international sense, seeing the Chinese revolution as "part of the world revolution."

First, by their initial victory in China, they "made a very big breach on the imperialist front in the East." By thus dealing "a fatal blow to the imperialist colonial system," they "have broken through once and for all the encirclement of socialism by world capitalism," turned the "rear for imperialism" (i.e., the colonial and semi-colonial areas) into "the forefront of the struggle against imperialism," and thereby "brought about the obvious superiority of the world camp of peace and democracy over the imperialist camp of aggression."¹³ This, indeed, is a big order! The Soviet Union's own pride notwithstanding, Khrushchev is recorded to have not confirmed his belief in the final, effective breaking-through of "capitalist encirclement" and the resultant counter-encircling of "world capitalism" until after he had gone to China in 1954.

An attendant contribution was the "inspiration" or "model for revolutionary victory" and "national rebirth" thus supplied by the C. C. P. to other colonial and semi-colonial countries, primarily in Asia and, then, in Africa and Latin America, i.e., in the entire "East." Mao is seen as having changed Marxism-Leninism from "a European form" to "an Asian form" and ultimately to an over-all non-Western form. There is today no longer any doubt that Peking makes this claim with all seriousness, especially vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.¹⁴ In fact, the Soviet Union has become so irritated (or perhaps worried) that it has started to scold Peking's "racist" views despite its own trouble with African students.¹⁵

Thirdly, the Chinese Communists, by apply-

ing "the Marxist-Leninist theory of uninterrupted revolution and the development of revolution by stages," think they have pushed through more "stages" of their revolution or accomplished more revolutions faster and with greater successes than any other "fraternal party." To them, theirs has been a continual history or "struggle" to participate in the "intellectual study" of Marxism initially, and then in the "bourgeois-democratic" revolution under Nationalist leadership (not without some coaxing from the Soviet Union); to change the latter into the victorious "New Democratic" revolution (by supplying their own "proletarian" leadership) and to bring it forward immediately to "socialist revolution" and "socialist transformation"; and, finally, to enter into the initial stage of "socialist construction" and at the same time to encourage "national liberation" in all colonial and semi-colonial areas abroad at the present, while the seeds for a Communist society are being sown in their own preferred form of social organization, i.e., the "People's Communes." All this has been accomplished within 40 or so years—without going through a stage of "capitalist" development in the Marxist-Leninist sense.¹⁶

There is no other party that, according to Liu Shao-ch'i, has "witnessed more important changes and accumulated more experiences of the revolutionary struggle in various complicated forms" than the C. C. P. within a comparable period.

Mao's ingenious application, inference and renovation of the dialectical materialist doctrine of "contradictions" throughout the above process have defeated and won over class enemies and enemy classes in the past. This has also resulted in the "qualitative" formulation of rules on "how to handle cor-

rectly contradictions among the people," i. e., among "socialist" forces both domestically and, as it turns out, internationally. This was applauded as having "solved, for the people living in the revolutionary era of socialism, the question of what the forces are behind the development of the socialist society—a fundamental question bearing on the socialist era and even on a Communist society." The concept of "positive balance," the device of periodic "rectification" (in contrast to outright purges), the policy of "long-term coexistence and mutual supervision" with a number of "democratic parties" are all viewed as representative of Maoist creativity.¹⁷

And finally, counting on, rather than fearing, frustrations (like the legendary Yü Kung, The Foolhardy Oldman, who proposed to move mountains with bare hands by banking on his posterity), the Chinese Communists have developed an entirely forward-looking, optimistic vision for national and international communism: "Man's Great Leap into the Future." The "Great Leap Forward," along with the "People's Communes," was launched as a "production struggle" and a "class struggle," i.e., in all aspects of practical and ideological work, including even the study of traditional Chinese and non-Chinese philosophy. The name of the first People's Commune, Wei-hsing (Earth Satellite), was symbolic of Peking's attempt to match the Soviet Union in the sphere of ideological advancement as well as "socialist construction." It represented a "Great Leap Forward" in human institutions at the same time, and is indicative of Peking's effort to give substance and credence to its version of Communist utopia as "the wave of the future."

"In the days of the great Marx and Engels," says Peking's Mme. Sun Yat-sen, "socialism and communism were still a dream. But in the contemporary world, socialism is a living reality and communism will soon be." "China's victory," in her estimation, "united the socialist camp over a broad and continuous land-mass with a population of over 900 millions" and "linked Europe and Asia in a new type of relation-

¹⁶ In this regard Soviet analysis, lacking a similar experience, shows no place for a "national bourgeoisie," nor anything called "bureaucratic capitalism."

¹⁷ A recent study by M. George Zaninovich on "The Sino-Soviet Theory of Conflict" (presented at the annual meeting of the American Orthopsychiatric Association in Washington, D. C., March 1963) has concluded that "Soviet thinkers view contradictions within the world environment as neither so prevalent nor so intense as do the Chinese theorists."

ship between peoples and nations, based on Marxist-Leninist precepts." Hence, it is the Chinese people under Communist rule who "are proud to be in the front ranks of man's advance into the future."¹⁸ Coupled with a similar pride expressed by Liu Shao-ch'i in the camp's embracing "one-third of the world's population" and extending over "a vast, compact land-mass in Europe and Asia," these remarks sound ominously "Heartlandish" in the geopolitical tradition and certainly chauvinistic both from the national and international point of view. Not only the "East Wind" now "prevails over the West Wind," as Mao has phrased it, but China represents this very "East Wind" or its main current, and its "prevailing" is "inevitable."¹⁹

Obviously, this would have the entire Communist movement and its utopia more or less Sinicized—to the dismay of non-Chinese Communists. What has resulted is a Sino-Soviet ideological dispute, which is still raging and will apparently continue to rage.

Chinese "fanaticism" and "adventurism," are self-evident, irrespective of outside criticism. But outside criticism has been found necessary, especially because such "fanaticism" and "adventurism" are based on the concepts of "contradictions" and "struggle." In their inevitably militant manifestations, these concepts lead to the question of peace and war both at the national and international level. And this question, should be viewed in conjunction with several others.

First, the C. C. P. has had the unforgettable

experience of having to win its final domestic victory through a protracted struggle, armed or otherwise, of 28 long years, after which it continued to be involved in Korea, the off-shore islands, and Tibet. The lessons of all these "struggles" were obviously, according to the dialectical materialist analysis, that the "developing" was superior to the "developed"; the "mutual transformation" of the "opposites" in "unity" was achieved through conscious, sustained and militant effort.

These lessons led inevitably to Mao's rationalized strategy to "despise" the enemy in the long-run and "respect" him in the short-run. Flexibility in a given place and at a given time but rigidity in over-all reasoning and planning resulted.

Thirdly, the emphasis on "developing" and long-run strategy has brought about the formulation of a theory of "Protracted War," which envisions three specific "stages" in the struggle against a superior enemy: tactical retreat to trade space for time, stalemate and see-saw fighting to wrest initiative from the enemy, and counter-attack and victory. The colonial and semi-colonial areas, formerly the "rear for imperialism," are now the "front" against the West. No commander—and Mao is an extremely experienced one—can afford to lose this opportunity to shift from the second to the third stage of the struggle. Specifically, imperialism and not capitalism in the national sphere is the arch enemy still.

Furthermore, wars have arisen and have continued, after World War II according to Maoist analysis and observation, in three specific types because of conflict of class interests in a class society and have been terminated or eliminated because of readjustment of such interests; not because of changes, even "qualitative," in weaponry. The "nuclear teeth" of the imperialist "paper tiger" can no more justifiably sustain an international relationship of subjugation (i.e., lack of readjustment of class interests) than prevent a just war (i.e., effort to effect such readjustment). To point at wars and war destructiveness or at "peace" and "peaceful co-existence" in abstract is misplacing the emphasis.²⁰

¹⁸ Soong Ching-ling, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

¹⁹ See Huang Yen-pei, "Big Leap Forward and Continued Big Leap Forward Are Possible and Inevitable; That the East Wind Will Continue to Prevail over the West Wind Is Also Possible and Inevitable," SCMP, No. 2254.

²⁰ See especially Yu Chao-li (pseudonym of Mao or confidant?), "Imperialism Is the Course of War in Modern Times and the Way for the People of All Countries to Struggle for Peace," SCMP, No. 2233; and "Mao's Strategy and Tactics," cited above. Cf. Richard Lowenthal, "Diplomacy and Revolution: The Dialectics of a Dispute," *The China Quarterly*, January-March, 1961. For Peking's rather consistent view on "peaceful co-existence," see Soong Ching-ling, "On Peaceful Co-existence," *People's China*, June 1, 1951, and also her "The People Can and Will Completely Defeat Imperialism!" in *Drive U.S. Imperialism Out of Asia*, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1960.

Between Peking and Moscow, as between "socialist forces" or friends well versed in dialectical materialism, both "struggle" and "unity" are necessary and, in the dialectical materialist sense, normal. Differences can be composed just as opposites can even coexist in a unity. "Contradictions" in this regard are not the same (i.e., antagonistic) as those with the enemy; their worse manifestation could amount to no more than an attempt at "mutual transformation" of the "opposites" in a "unity"—which, in any case, would benefit the underdog or "developing" side (i.e., Peking). From the latter's point of view, therefore, "struggle is happiness."

CHINESE UNDERDOG PHILOSOPHY

What lies behind this peculiar mentality on the part of the Chinese Communists? It struck this writer that the traditional Chinese political underdog's rebellious psychology and the West's modern self-criticism in its economic and political system are responsible for the rise of a representative personality such as Mao Tse-tung, and a composite movement such as the Chinese Communist revolution. Communism, as Toynbee has pointed out, is the West's own critic and its delinquent offspring. The West's *status quo* trampled on China. The Chinese *status quo* neither resisted nor collaborated with the Western *status quo* successfully. This led to a not very unnatural marriage between the Chinese underdog and the Western one now engaged in the overthrow of its own *status quo*—a marriage observable even in the days of the reformers (during the twilight period of the Manchu dynasty) in China.

Chinese reformers had already rationalized that "Western society was sick, and something had to be done about it." Consequently, they were "just as ready as the Communists to consign the West to revolution." Mao has merely inherited this trend of thinking, and

his embracing of communism, the Western delinquent offspring, is meant simply to procreate "the superior theory and practice of a renescent China."

Furthermore, the Chinese reformers took a dim view of the then emerging Communist movement in the West, thinking that all Westerners, even though "proletarian" and "revolutionary, would live just as the modern financial and military titans do, by the same rule: *Jo jou ch'iang shih*, 'the weak are meat, the strong eat.'"²¹ Stressing "living standards" (or "bourgeois comfort") and preservation of their existing "socialist achievements," and bullying "fraternal" parties and countries from time to time, the Russians today have come surprisingly close to confirming the Chinese apprehension. Comparing signs, one gets the message that, from Peking's point of view, only China, with her mellowed, deep-rooted, benevolent even while imperialist, non-Western civilization, could avoid following the same perilous route. It is not inconceivable, therefore, that in Peking's view, and with the Maoist system operating, it is said, "with a higher 'creativity,' with an apparently superior intellectual capacity, a shrewder political sense, than has been the case in Russia,"²² man's utopia looks like "a Communist Empire with the 'Middle Kingdom' at its center."²³

Even though a "revisionist" may be subject to criticism for saying that "in its forms, its paths and its means socialism is not a process which is repeated every time and everywhere in the same way, that is, free from all the influences of the material and ideological elements of the given period, environment and conditions," and even though the term "national communism" can be nomi-

(Continued on page 181)

²¹ See Joseph R. Levenson, *Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the Mind of Modern China*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1953, pp. 6, 213.

²² Garvey, *op. cit.*, pp. 103f.

²³ See U. Alexis Johnson's analogy in "Red China and the U.S.S.R.," U.S. Department of State *Bulletin*, February 25, 1963, p. 277.

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Analyzing the Chinese agricultural situation, this observer queries: "In a decentralized, agrarian economy depending squarely on millions of human beings, and lacking so many goods, services and transportation facilities, can a free market system operate equitably? If not, how far can the State go in compelling and persuading more production? And how can the harvests of the fields be moved into the economy quickly all over the country?"

Trends in Chinese Agriculture

By THEODORE HERMAN

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WHILE IT is reported that Communist China is now pulling out of its grave farm crisis of 1959-1961, any account of the difficulties and gains during 1962-1963 must look at various factors in the recent past. Unfortunately we have no official statistics for any crop output since 1960, and there is great doubt abroad about the reliability of those before 1960. Nor are we sure that the authorities in Peking have accurate records, although possibly they have reasonably good estimates of harvests in some areas.

However, the lack of figures does not prevent economists outside of China from making estimates based on general remarks of travelers in China, on careful watching of Chinese agricultural trade figures with other countries, and on detailed studies of the methods of Chinese statistical collection and economic computation. Such estimates are at best educated guesses, valuable as intellectual exercises, to throw some light on China's policies, or to support a position either favoring

or opposing the People's Republic of China.

Yet despite this factual vacuum, it is highly important to understand the importance of agriculture in Chinese economic life and how the Chinese are trying to meet their farm problems. One would assume that everyone on the mainland knows how basic agriculture is, but it was only in January, 1961, that the Central Committee of the Communist Party finally turned the course of economic planning away from rapid industrial expansion to a primary emphasis on agriculture.¹ This about-face reflected the poor crop years of 1959 through 1961, the growth of population, and the rise in consumer demand. It was buttressed by frequent reference in the press to the great dependence on agriculture: 50 per cent of industrial and handicraft output by value from the manufacture of agricultural products; over 70 per cent of the country's exports; 50 per cent of the financial revenue to the national and local authorities; and over 60 per cent of all retail sales of consumer goods in rural areas to at least 80 per cent of the population.²

The planning of priorities before and after 1961 should not be seen in absolute terms, for China certainly needs industrial output of all kinds. Rather, the change marked a recognition that in order to meet a widespread food emergency and to guard against such a

¹ The official English text appears in *Peking Review* IV.4, Jan. 27, 1961, pp. 5-6.

² Giuseppe Regis, "Developments in China's Agriculture, Part I," *Far East Trade* 17.1, Jan., 1962, p. 49, based on Liao Lu-yen, Minister of Agriculture, "The Whole Party and the Whole People Go In for Agriculture in a Big Way," *Hung Ch'i* [Red Flag], 17, Sept. 1, 1960, in *Survey of China Mainland Magazines* (SCMM), 228, pp. 1-10.

grave threat in the near future, it was vital to reduce investment going into heavy capital construction, work with the basic facilities created up to 1961, and devote as much industrial output as possible to make China agriculturally secure over the next 10 to 20 years. This of course requires further industrial investment, as in chemicals for fertilizer, insecticides, and synthetic textiles, in truck and tractor plants, and in farm implement shops. Where the specific retrenchments have occurred we do not know, unless in some of the large hydro projects, urban building, railway extension, and the like; we do not hear much about such new construction at this time.

NEW EMPHASIS ON AGRICULTURE

In a far-sighted article in October, 1959, before the three successive years of poor crops, Chairman Po I-po took issue with those who urged rapid industrialization with little regard for agricultural improvement. He called for an eventual doubling of the announced 1958 figures of 250 million metric tons of grain, and a tripling of the cotton harvest of 2.1 million metric tons, with even greater increases in other farm and animal products. Such targets, he said, could not be reached by further "mobilizing of latent labor power," but only by a ten-year program of technical transformation of agriculture through mechanization, electrification, and the production of chemical fertilizer, so that

... by 1969 or thereabouts, all the land in our country which can be cultivated by machines will be worked, in the main, with mechanical in-

stead of animal traction; and where irrigation by machines is needed it will, in the main, replace human labor. . . .³

In the regional planning for agricultural increases, the country was mapped into three zones, mainly on the basis of rainfall and length of growing season, with over-all grain yields in *jin* per *mou* set for 1967.⁴

Zone I seems to require large-scale mechanization and wind-erosion control in the broad dry lands of Inner Mongolia and the northeast, intensive slope repair for water and soil conservation in the hilly north, and concentrated oasis cultivation in the far northwest. Zones II and III, with some 25 inches of rainfall and more than seven months' growing season but densely populated, need high investment in water conservation and smaller farm machinery, with much fertilizer for the centuries-worked soils. Hillside cultivation and conservation, along with lowland canal building, would be major out-of-season occupations for the large farm labor force.

Those who wonder about the wisdom of mechanizing agriculture in the face of China's tremendous population do not face up to the immediate need of feeding and clothing the millions already on the scene and of providing some security for their children and grandchildren. (The long-term job of slowing down the birth rate is now going on and must go on for decades.)

Farm mechanization speeds up the growing season, especially for multicropping, by shortening the time for planting and harvesting, while electrification gives control of crop water in flood and drought as well as power for crop processing. Mechanization releases labor for more productive work in other crops, light industry, mining, or land reclamation. It also raises labor productivity on the farm; one article calculated that the mechanization of plowing, raking, and sowing of grain [presumably dry grain] permits one farmer to raise 440 pounds per year for 145 people instead of the usual 53 people.⁵

Producing the necessary machines has become one of China's first industrial goals. By the end of 1969, China is supposed to have

³ The official English text is in *Peking Review* II.45, Nov. 10, 1959, pp. 6-11. Regis makes some specific projections of equipment and fertilizers needed to meet these goals in "Developments in China's Agriculture," Parts II and III, *ibid.*, 17.3, Mar., 1962, pp. 297-300, and 17.4, Apr., 1962, pp. 425-426. Regis was in China as a trade consultant doing market research from 1957 to 1961.

⁴ Yang Min, "Twelve-Year Plan for Agriculture," *Peking Review* I.3, Mar., 18, 1958, pp. 11-13.

⁵ Derived from Wang Kuang-wei, "Actively and Steadily Carry Out Technical Transformation of Agriculture," *Ching-chi Yen-chiu* [Economic Research], 3, Mar. 17, 1963, in SCMM 361, pp. 38-39.

1.2 million tractors (15 hp. as the basic unit). At the end of 1962 there were reported to be more than 100,000 (in 15 hp. units),⁶ of which more than 50,000 were imported;⁷ more than 40,000 (in 15 hp. units) had been made in China during 1960 and 1961.⁸ Also, it was reported that by the end of 1962 there were almost 6 million hp. of irrigation and drainage machinery (power sources not specified), including 1.4 million kw. of electric pumping equipment, or more than ten times the total of 1957. The eventual goal seems to be 20 million hp. for irrigation and drainage,⁹ though Regis projects 30 million.¹⁰ Any realistic targets of this kind must also assume that the electricity, transmission facilities and pipe are available, and that the high rate of use under climatic and topographic conditions does not cause too much wear on the equipment; an indication of the latter as a drain on the industry occurs in the note that in January, 1962, 65 per cent of the tractors and 48 per cent of the irrigation machinery made in 1960–1961 needed repair.

While water control and mechanization can maintain farm output at a higher level, chemical fertilizer is the key to rapid increase from almost any level, since it is considerably more active than natural—mainly organic—fertilizers. A revealing comparison of chemi-

cal fertilizer used in 1958 in China with that in Italy and Japan is offered by Regis:

The 2.7 million tons of nitrogen and phosphoric anhydride fertilizers distributed in 1958 correspond, given their composition, to about 540,000 tons of nitrogen and phosphoric anhydride, amounting to under 5 kg. of fertilizer substance per hectare. By comparison . . . in the same period in Italy the amount of these fertilizers, plus potassium oxide, used was 60 kg. per hectare, and in Japan about 240 kg. per hectare was used.¹¹

According to official thinking in 1960, China should “strive to produce 5–7 million tons [of chemical fertilizer] by 1962 and approximately 15 million tons by 1967.”¹² However, a recent article by the Vice-Minister of Geology indicates that the eventual target to give 60 kg. per hectare of active chemical fertilizer per year requires 16 million tons each of nitrogenous, phosphorous, and potassium fertilizers every year. The greatest lack seems to be in sources of phosphorous and potassium.¹³

It is not possible to say how close to the original 1962 target of home manufactured chemical fertilizer China came, but a reasonable guess is between 2.1 and 2.5 million metric tons.¹⁴ Also, China continues to be one of the world's largest importers at about 1 million tons per year. While chemical fertilizer brings quick results, it has required in China the expansion of fertilizer and of basic chemical output, the search for deposits and industrial by-products, transportation of bulky materials, and education in the correct use of specific crops and specific soils.

EMPHASIS ON LOCAL CONDITIONS

Increasingly there seems to be an emphasis on solving agricultural problems by attention to local conditions. This may reflect the realization that central planning has little value for meeting the actual problems of growing crops, and indeed, that it has led to many mistakes as pressure has been applied to get more from the land. Also, it may reflect an increase in locally trained specialists.

One of the clearest statements of this down-to-earth approach came in a speech by the First Secretary¹⁵ of the Hupei Provincial

⁶ Wang Wei, “Modernizing China's agriculture,” *Peking Review* VI.9, Mar. 1, 1963, p. 28.

⁷ Regis, *op. cit.*, Part I, Jan., 1962, p. 51.

⁸ Chang Feng-shih, Deputy Minister of Agricultural Machinery, “Exert the Utmost for Timely Production of Suitable Agricultural Machinery . . .,” *Peking Kung-jen Jih-pao* [Workers Daily], Jan. 18, 1962, in *Survey of China Mainland Press* (SCMP) 2674, p. 16.

⁹ “Some Problems Concerning Agricultural Mechanization,” *Shih-shih Shou-ts'e* [Current Events], 23, Dec. 1962, in SCMM 352, p. 16.

¹⁰ Regis, *op. cit.*, II, March, 1962, p. 299.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, I, Jan., 1962, p. 51.

¹² People's Republic of China. *National Programme for Agricultural Development 1956–1957*, Peking, 1960, English-language edition, p. 12.

¹³ Ho Ch'ang-kung, “The Glorious Task of Geological Workers in Aiding Agriculture,” *Kung-jen Jih-pao*, Feb. 5, 1963, in SCMP 2926, p. 7.

¹⁴ *Christian Science Monitor*, Apr. 15, 1963, and *Peking Review*, I.2, Mar. 11, 1958, p. 14; IV.19, May 12, 1961, p. 13; and VI.4, Jan. 25, 1963, p. 17.

¹⁵ Wang Jen-chung, “Struggle for the Realization of the Modernization of Agriculture . . .,” *Chung-kuo Nung-yeh* [Chinese Agriculture], 2, Feb. 10, 1963, in SCMM 357, pp. 1–7.

Party Committee at a provincial conference on agriculture in 1962. In place of the usual tribute to Party wisdom and the lofty exhortation to cultivate ever more industrious habits, Secretary Wang listed the following five principles necessary to technical reform; 1) conform to local conditions, 2) do what is within our strength, 3) experiment and demonstrate improvements in order to persuade the masses rather than coerce them, 4) inherit good local experience before trying reforms, and 5) carry out technical reform methodically and with regard to the degree of urgency. That these fairly obvious principles had to be spelled out indicates that other methods had been used, a fact confirmed by the speaker's admission that

In the spring of 1960 . . . we called for the joint promotion of greater cultivated acreage and higher per-unit-area yield. . . . In the past few years, the cultivated acreage was extended to no small extent, and pronounced results were obtained in many localities. However, improper land reclamation was also carried out. In some cases, land reclamation affected field care and water and soil conservancy, and caused the loss of water and soil. All this is wrong. Greater emphasis should be given either to the extension of cultivated acreage or the raising of per-unit-yield, and the leading position must be given to the raising of per-unit-area yield. This must be done now as well as in the future.¹⁶

The report of a conference of agricultural officials on green manure (nitrogen-fixing crops) and phosphate fertilizer use, again in Hupei Province in the summer of 1962 discussed in more detail the problems of pressure for results and some of the mistakes.¹⁷ The report emphasized that with the drop in Hupei's grain output there was a need to re-

store soil fertility by starting from local practices in the use of green manure crops and wild vegetation, by educating the farmers to make improvements through careful experiment and demonstration, and by resisting the hasty reclamation of mountain wasteland for summer crops when these lands furnish the wild vegetation to be rotted on the far more important rice fields. Without an adequate supply of chemical fertilizer and knowledge of how to use it, traditional methods of fertilization must be used and improved.

Elsewhere attention is called to the need to use local soils properly, as, for instance, in the drought-stricken area of north Honan and west Shantung Provinces where too much irrigation without knowing soil and crop behavior raised large deposits of salt and alkali that greatly reduced crop yields.¹⁸ Efforts are also being made to design farm machinery for various crops and cropping conditions, as in the wet rice fields in the south.

One of the most unexpected changes in local conditions emerges in an article by Yu Mei, Vice-Minister of Communications, who noted that one of the difficulties in maintaining shipping routes in rural areas arises from the changes in water levels and channels through greater irrigation use and from increased silting.¹⁹ The point is not that these changes are new in China but that the land is being worked harder, while the necessary safeguards are lacking. What is needed is scientific knowledge of a high order, technical and financial resources, and official commitment to long-range regional planning. None of these can be created in a single generation in China, nor were they in the West where the scientific revolution in agriculture has been accelerating for the past 200 years.

SCIENTIFIC WORK IN AGRICULTURE

There seems to be a considerable amount of scientific work going on in agriculture, some of immediate use and a great deal of basic importance. Much of this has been started from scratch. In plant breeding it is noted that

Since liberation [1949] more than 700 good varieties of crops have been selected and bred in

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

¹⁷ Hsu Chueh-fei, Deputy Director of the Hupei Provincial Scientific Committee, "Summary of the Hupei Provincial Symposium on Green Manure and Phosphate Fertilizer," *Hu-pei Nung-yeh K'o-hsueh* [Hupei Agricultural Science], 2, Oct. 10, 1961, in SCMM 349, pp. 16-26.

¹⁸ Su Tsung-sung of the China Institute of Agricultural Science, "Prevention of Salinization and Alkalization in Irrigated Areas According to Local Conditions," Peking *Jen-min Jih-pao* [People's Daily], May 25, 1962, in SCMP 2757, pp. 13-17.

¹⁹ Yu Mei, "Face Agriculture and the Countryside. . . ." *Shui Yuan* [Water-Borne Transport], 1, Jan. 7, 1963, in SCMM 357, p. 9.

different places throughout the country. Of these, more than 400 varieties were bred and popularized after 1958. However, the areas over which they are popularized are not big enough.²⁰

Scientific research has a headstart over improvement in many other fields because there is a great body of local peasant experience to tap, and there have been widespread and continued efforts in China at least since 1925, despite inadequate finances. Shen states that because of the need for two crops on the same land within a year, "Early maturity is the most important characteristic of Chinese crop varieties."²¹ Today, increasing attention is reportedly being paid to breeding disease-resistant varieties and to manufacturing chemical pesticides. But breeding is also being directed to other goals, such as uniform growth of rice, wheat, cotton and soy bean for mechanized harvesting, and to determine if it is economically worthwhile to propagate high-yield slow-growing varieties that might delay the planting of a second crop.

Raising output through plant breeding appears economical because there is no need to erect large factories, as with fertilizer and tractors; yet such work demands years of patient, sustained laboratory and field work by people well trained in various related sciences at advanced levels.

In meteorology it is reported that a greatly expanded network "now covers every pro-

vince . . . and weather posts have been set up in almost all *hsien* and people's communes."²² While forecasting is directly applied to farming and water control, theoretical study based on sophisticated measurement of upper air mass behavior is also progressing.

The scientific study of problems outside the laboratory reveals the need for much broader knowledge than any single academic field offers, plus the need for more detailed study in order to formulate hypotheses. Thus, multi-discipline scientific conferences seem to be taking place to define problems and to share results. For example, in questions of land use it is recognized that a system of soil classification that will apply to natural and to cultivated soils is necessary.²³ Reports of discussions of soil properties and water behavior on the North China Plain show the experts divided on causes and treatments that call for more understanding of water conservancy, agriculture, forestry, hydrology and meteorology.²⁴ Planning for soil conservation in the middle part of the Yellow River Basin requires collaboration across different, perhaps more difficult, personal "empires," because erosion is caused both by nature and by man's uses of the land for crops, grazing, and forests. How do academic men and administrators plan wise use of this great watershed?²⁵

ORGANIZATION OF AGRICULTURE

Since 1958, most of China's farmers have been organized into some 26,000 communes with an average of 10,666 acres (almost 17 square miles), 5,000 peasant households or 10,000 working people.²⁶ This corresponds to an American township both in size and regional administration, but the commune is supposed to be a much more complete economic and social unit. Land is owned in common. Labor is assigned to 750,000 production brigades subdivided into some 3 million production teams of 20-30 families of 50-60 workers caring for 30-50 acres. While the team is now considered the "basic accounting unit" for meeting the State's quotas, paying taxes, and rewarding its members, the commune, through its board of managers

²⁰ Tai Sung-en, "Fully Develop the Role of Crops of Good Breed to Increase Production," *Hung Ch'i*, 2, Jan. 23, 1963, in SCMM 353, p. 16.

²¹ T. H. Shen, *Agricultural Resources of China*, Ithaca, N. Y., 1951, p. 41.

²² New China News Agency—English, Peking, Dec. 10, 1962, in SCMP 2880, pp. 21-22.

²³ Hsu Sung-ling and Yuan Hsu-hsia, "The China Society of Agrology Annual Meeting in Nanking . . .," *Peking Kuang-ming Jih-pao* [Light Daily], July 15, 1962, in SCMP 2793, pp. 14-16.

²⁴ "The Problem of Preventing and Treating Soil Salinization and Alkalinization," *Peking Kuang-ming Jih-pao*, Apr. 10, 1962, in SCMP 2731, pp. 13-15.

²⁵ Chao Ming-fu, "Discourse on Soil Conservancy in the Yellow River Basin," *Hung Ch'i*, 21, Nov. 1, 1962, in SCMM 341, 29-37.

²⁶ Tan Chen-lin, "Strive for the Fulfillment, Ahead of Schedule, of the National Programme for Agricultural Development," *Peking Review*, III.15, Apr. 12, 1960, p. 10. Although Tan in 1960 gave the figure of 24,000 communes, sources since then have been using the figure 26,000 consistently.

and district Party secretary, is supposed to develop as much industry, mining, reclamation, education, health and welfare as resources permit.

In the five years since the communes were formed; many changes from the original sweeping excesses have occurred, both because of declining yields and peasant objections. But the net result is a tighter unit than existed before 1958, at least at the team or village level, for sharing labor and knowledge, for managing land and water, and for indoctrinating millions of peasants with the Party ideology.

In addition, there are more than 2,000 State farms,²⁷ mostly on formerly uninhabited wastelands in frontier, coastal, mountainous and lakeland areas in every province, and staffed by ex-servicemen, overseas Chinese returned to China, and young people. It is claimed that on these farms all heavy work is basically mechanized, and much large-scale reclamation has been put into effect.²⁸ How much member participation exists in State farm management is not stated, but

State farms are run like factories and employees on them are wage workers who have no private ownership rights. They are a stage beyond collectivization, in Communist theory; they are "owned by the whole people" and thus already have "elements of communism." Cultivators receive high cash wages comparable to those of factory workers, and the general standard of living is much above that of the cooperative farms.²⁹

It may very well be that State farms are in-

²⁷ NCNA—English, Peking, Feb. 5, 1962, in SCMP 2677, p. 24.

²⁸ Chang Hsing-san, "State Farms Rise on Wastelands," *China Reconstructs* XI.6, June, 1962, pp. 24-27.

²⁹ Edgar Snow, *The Other Side of the River*, New York, 1962, p. 491. By "cooperative farms" Snow may mean "commune farms."

³⁰ The theoretical distinctions are discussed quite clearly in Chao Hsu-kuang, "Why Must the System, 'To Each According to His Work,' Be Enforced?", *Peking Kung-jen Jih-pao*, Nov. 14, 1961, in *Current Background* (CB) 677, pp. 6-11, and in Ku Yu-ch'ing, "Rural People's Communes Will Remain Collective Economic Organizations of Socialism for a Long Period to Come," *Peking Kung-jen Jih-pao*, Dec. 5, 1961, in *ibid.*, pp. 26-29.

³¹ Wang Shu-wen, "The Rights and Obligations of Members of Rural People's Communes," *Peking Kung-jen Jih-pao*, November 28, 1961, in CB 677, p. 21.

deed laboratories, both technical and social, for eventually changing the rural communes into complete Communist units where reward is according to "ability and need," rather than the present system of collective ownership of land and the instruments of production where (since 1960) reward is according to work done. However, it will take a long time to create the abundance and the personnel for the former, and hence to create conditions where millions of people will give their best, in good Marxist fashion, for the good of all.³⁰

Meanwhile, in the communes, the many problems of rights and duties at the team level are being threshed out, while the role of the commune appears to have slipped from attention. Private ownership of "all the means of subsistence owned by the members" [except land and work animals] is "forever assured."³¹ Members are allowed to cultivate small plots on assigned land for private income and sale. But the human problems in applying such rules demand constant attention; reports show that some members till their own plots before those of the commune, and much labor is lost in carrying private produce to market. One of the knottiest problems is how to set work points for wage payments, given the variety of jobs to do and the physical differences of the land.

Other cases have turned up of members dividing the harvest among themselves before giving the assigned quota to the State, or of not sharing their own surplus with those in need. In a decentralized, agrarian economy depending squarely on millions of human beings, and lacking so many goods, services and transportation facilities, can a free market system operate equitably? If not, how far can the State go in compelling and persuading more production? And how can the harvests of the fields be moved into the economy quickly all over the country?

AGRICULTURAL INCENTIVES

China does not have the wealth to reward private enterprise to the extent that we have in America. Thus, different incentives have been set up to earn social approbation and personal prestige, a system of reward well

known to any one in this country, too. The Chinese farmer is constantly told to serve his country by producing as much as possible, by improving the land for the future, by learning to work better, by sharing in group discussions, by helping others. He wins public praise, his team gets a banner, he may be chosen for a position of local leadership, he may be able to buy consumers goods more readily than ever before. In short, he is made to feel part of the wave of the future.

THE CADRE

The most important agent of ideological control is the cadre or social energizer, the like of which we do not have in Western society. In the communes, cadres are of two ranks: those in the production brigades who are appointed by the Party, and those in the production teams presumably elected by their fellow villagers. The former do not always have farm experience, but they have the direct responsibility to see that quotas are met by the teams of each brigade, and by all the brigades within the commune.

A Party brigade cadre is expected to advise his several production teams in planning for farming and all other labor assignments, and to help in the sharing of facilities such as oxen or tools between teams. He must be sure that the crop plans first meet the needs of the State as set in the commune quotas rather than the search for income by the members. It may take much ideological persuading to stiffen the team cadres against the pull of their lifelong neighbors, or vice-versa, to make the team cadres pay attention to their neighbors. The Party cadre must keep constant check on the work-point records and the teams' expense accounts in order to preserve harmony; and he must also collect taxes.

Since the tragic over-inflation of harvest results in 1958, the cadre, under pressure to meet quotas, is no longer in charge of crop reporting.³² He tries to find the needs for the villagers elsewhere but, because of limited contacts, may not be effective. When in-

structions for reorganization or technical change come from Peking, he has the task of executing them. He is also expected to toil personally in an emergency to set a good example of active participation.

The way in which the brigade cadre works with his teams is as important as the job itself, as shown by the good and bad examples in the Chinese press. Some cadres seem to work understandingly and build the villagers' confidence in open decision-making, a task not easily carried out even in our own democratically-oriented small communities, while others are true bureaucrats guilty of such faults as absenteeism, commandism, and compromise. A patient reading of articles on the communes from the Chinese press reminds us again and again that neither all the farmers nor all the officials think alike. They are human beings with different attitudes and abilities, and they live in a country that is lacking in uniformity, both physically and socially.

ESSENCE OF COMMUNIST PLANNING

If Communist planning has assumed that there was already a united will to sacrifice all for the goals set in Peking or on the other hand that there was unyielding resistance everywhere to those goals, such planning would have been even more unrealistic. The essence of Mao's leadership has been to find the largest common measures of rural needs and to lead or compel the largest segments of the peasantry towards the achievement of them.

This is why the brigade cadres are mainly Party men who are expected to stimulate the peasants ideologically to put public above private interests. The question is not simply whether a Communist regime can overcome famine, but what any Chinese government can do to rouse millions of people into a more productive and inviting life.

The men in Peking have made mistakes and will probably make many more, especially since so much of officialdom is composed of people with so little solid contribution to make that they must build up their jobs on the basis of upholding ideological purity. This is not

³² Snow, *op. cit.*, pp. 174-176.

said in disparity but simply to point out a fact reflected in the Party's frequent campaigns inviting public criticism of lower-level officials and ordering them to work from time to time in the fields. Some ideology is necessary to shape the ethics of any enterprise, but the best organization for Chinese agriculture is apparently still undecided:

I told a leading Communist, a friend of mine from Yen-an, what I thought of communes. I went overboard in enthusiasm for this organization that made millions on \$20,000 capital in a few weeks, and could "just make" roads and 82 reservoirs without cost. He pulled me up: fortunately for China the Chinese Communist Party is more cool-headed than I.

"We put it this way: are the communes good or are they not good?" I stared at him, and he continued, "We think they are good but it will take us ten years to test."

Smiling at my deflation, he continued: "You have been seeing the best communes, the ones that send delegates to Peking, those which set examples for the rest. The great potential you notice undoubtedly exists. But there are also communes which voted themselves free food yet do not have enough harvest to feed themselves until the next crop. These will have to be helped by the State. There are other communes which have established a wage scale but do not have enough surplus funds to pay these wages for very long. We think the communes are the form for us, but undoubtedly there will be some failures this winter. This does not matter. We shall all learn from the failures and they will reorganize and finally succeed. . . ."³³

AGRICULTURAL PROSPECTS

In conclusion, what are the prospects for Chinese agriculture? Back in 1949 the leading Western expert on Chinese agricultural economics, Professor J. L. Buck, made the surprising statement that

If the size of farm business (quite another thing than size of farms) is increased through

improved technological practices, the evils of farm tenancy are remedied, credit made available at reasonable rates and equitable taxation effected, there is no reason why China could not increase her food production by 50 percent. . . .

Size of farm business can be increased by more and better irrigation and drainage, application of more fertilizers, better cultural practices, and by growing crops that give greater returns per acre and at the same time require additional labor. . . .

There is no need for China to import food, and it is unwise for any country to plan to export wheat, cotton or tobacco to China. China is able to produce them all in sufficient quantities for her own consumption and intends to do so.³⁴

Buck, however, did not favor any form of pooling land, labor, or produce, nor the release of farm labor by mechanization without having other employment.

As of July, 1963, China seems to have had more food available than in the four previous years. Yet even in 1960, a bad year, Edgar Snow, visiting 11 rural communes in central and north China plus many other localities where people were working hard, reports strict rationing, including occasional signs of malnutrition among children in two cities, but no mass starvation.³⁵ Since the fall of 1962 drought reports from Hong Kong and south China have been serious, but in other parts of the country yields are reported to have been good.³⁶

Good yields for a few years are, of course, not enough. The job is to get so far ahead of the best yields of the past that a firm base will be laid for economic stability. This seems to be the course of China's agricultural activity during the past year or two.

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³³ Anna Louise Strong, *The Rise of the Chinese People's Communes*, Peking, 1959, pp. 125-126. Miss Strong seems to have had this conversation early in 1959; since then, the communes have very much changed in function.

³⁴ J. L. Buck, "Fact and Theory About China's Land," *Foreign Affairs* 28.1, Oct., 1949, pp. 98-99.

³⁵ Snow, *op. cit.*, p. 583.

³⁶ Our Shanghai Correspondent, "Food Supply Improved," *Far Eastern Economic Review* 40.2, Apr. 11, 1963, pp. 55-56.

Noting that "the role of the industrial sector in aiding economic recovery appears to be the replacement and rehabilitation of . . . depleted and abused capital stock," this specialist observes that "the role of industry in the present context of the Communist Chinese economy is an essential but unambitious one." He sees the period 1962-1963 as "marked by an effort to stabilize and increase agricultural production . . . any ambitious plan to industrialize further, rapidly and on a massive scale simply cannot be seriously considered at the moment."

Industrial Development in China

By YUAN-LI WU

Professor of International Business, University of San Francisco

FROM TIME to time, the Western press indulges in speculation on the date when Communist China will acquire nuclear capability. In this connection the comment is frequently made that the economic crisis which began in 1960 has had an especially adverse effect on industrial development and has therefore resulted in a postponement of this date although the technological and scientific competence of the Chinese to effect nuclear fission is usually conceded. Apart from its military and political implications, the present state of Communist China's industrial development is no less significant from the point of view of economic growth.

The record of industrial expansion demonstrated during Communist China's First Five Year Plan (1953-1957) was highly creditable. As a matter of fact, as of 1957, Communist China was about to be considered by most observers as one of the rare specimens of successful "bootstrap" operation in which the take-off into sustained economic growth was effected with little external help. It was at this juncture that the "Great Leap Forward" was introduced with disastrous results. Now

that the downswing may have lost its momentum, although it may be premature to speak definitely of the "bottoming out" of the recession, one wonders whether renewed economic growth might not once more bring Communist China to the forefront of the developing nations and whether industrialization in particular might not again play a key role.

In order to answer these questions, one has to appreciate the altered role of the industrial sector in the Chinese economy since 1961 and the effect of the reorientation of economic policy following the realization by the Communist planners of the gravity of the economic crisis. One can probably date the reorientation of policy to the January, 1961, meeting of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist party which called for the "readjustment, consolidation, substantiation and improvement" of industry, thus spelling the end of the quantitative emphasis which had wrought so much general havoc during the "Great Leap."¹ A more far-reaching policy directive, however, was brought out during the winter of the same year when a set of 70 articles was issued to regulate industrial development.

These policy guide lines stipulated, *inter alia*, (1) the discontinuation of all capital construction projects other than those granted

¹ *Fei-ch'ing Yen-chiu* (Research on Mainland China), Vol. V, No. 12, Taipei, December 25, 1962, pp. 89-99.

special permission to continue, (2) the closing of all enterprises which were unable to meet their operating costs unless special exemption had been given, and (3) stabilization of the agricultural, as well as industrial, labor force by prohibiting unauthorized recruitment and direction of labor. The National People's Congress convened in April, 1962, reaffirmed this policy and, deviating further from the policy of the "big push," called for the balanced growth of the economy with a priority scale of agriculture, light industry, and heavy industry in order of diminishing importance. Among the ten policy directives published at the time were the curtailment of capital construction, return of former agricultural workers from urban to rural areas, and better utilization of working capital and inventory adjustments.²

Finally, in September, 1962, the Central Committee of the Communist party again reiterated its admonition to pursue the program of industrial readjustment and to give all-out financial, material and technical support to agricultural production. Development in the industrial sector was to be selective both in terms of products and in terms of plants operated on the basis of available inputs and efficiency of operation. The inefficient plants and those plants which produced goods deemed unrelated to the immediate goals were to be shut down or curtailed.³ With the exception of the maintenance of the defense industries, the immediate goals at this time were and apparently continue to be support of

agriculture and supply of the consumers' market.⁴

In the light of the prevailing approach to economic development, an assessment of Communist China's industrial development may be undertaken from several points of view. First, the reorientation of properties and the primary emphasis on agriculture raise a question about the significance and effectiveness of the support which industry has given to agriculture. In what manner has this assistance been furnished? If agricultural recovery is essential to economic stabilization and a general upturn, to what extent has the altered industrial policy contributed to the recovery of agriculture? In the second place, given the curtailment of industrial production and investment, how would the economic growth rate be affected in the long run? In spite of the lack of detailed current data, some tentative deductions can be made.

IRRIGATION AND "ELECTRIFICATION"

One of the means by which industrial production is expected to aid agricultural development is the supply of pumping equipment for irrigation and drainage. According to the *People's Daily*,⁵ 3.3 million hectares of land were irrigated and drained with electrically operated installations toward the end of 1961. The total capacity of power-driven pumps, including diesel and other types, amounted to 6 million h.p. at the time, which may be compared with 500,000 h.p. in 1957 and 100,000 h.p. in 1949.⁶ A later report has since put the capacity at about 7 million h.p.⁷ Much of the equipment was clearly a part of the output of the domestic electrical equipment manufacturing industry. A noticeable change in the composition of the production of the industry has apparently taken place.

However, the 3.3 million hectares of land which had the benefit of the power-driven pumps in 1961 constituted no more than six per cent of some 54.7 million hectares of irrigated land.⁸ This was no more than three to four per cent of the total cultivated area of the country. Furthermore, reports on the erection of high tension transmission lines to supply electricity to the pumping stations

² *Jen-min Jih-pao* (People's Daily), Peking, April 17, 1962.

³ *Shih-tai P'i-p'ing*, Vol. 15, No. 9, Hong Kong, November 1, 1962, pp. 10-19.

⁴ *Ta-kung Pao*, Peking, October 1, 1962.

⁵ Peking, October 23, 1961.

⁶ *China Trade and Economic Newsletter*, No. 75, London, January, 1962, p. 5. Also reported in *Fei-ching Yüeh-pao* (Monthly Report on Mainland China), Vol. V, No. 2, Taipei, February, 1962, p. 41.

⁷ *Ta-kung Pao*, October 1, 1962, quoted in *Tsukuo* (China Weekly), Hong Kong, November 19, 1962.

⁸ Estimate for 1960 year end, obtained from the 1957 figure of 34.7 million hectares plus an increment of 20 million hectares of "effectively irrigated" area during 1958-60. *Kung-jen Jih-pao* (Workers' Daily), Peking, March 8, 1961, and *The Great Ten Years*, Peking, 1959.

suggest that the many small rural power stations being established during the "Great Leap" period were apparently ineffective and unreliable. Thus the advantage of electrification in irrigation and drainage would for some time have to be confined to areas served by large power plants located in the principal industrial cities. This conclusion seems to be supported by the reported location of the irrigation districts served by electricity inasmuch as the major areas seemed to be the Pearl River delta around Canton, the Tientsin-Peking area in Hopei, northern Kiangsu and the environs of Shanghai, and areas in Shensi, probably around Sian, where large power plants are known to exist.⁹

"MECHANIZATION" OF AGRICULTURE

Apart from "electrification," the program to "mechanize" agriculture, a slogan first advanced during the period of collectivization, consisted mostly of the introduction of various types of tractors and farm machinery in certain parts of the country, together with the production of simple farm implements. Local reports suggest that a number of machine-

making plants have been assigned specifically to this task.¹⁰ The concentrated effort, according to the New China News Agency,¹¹ resulted in the production of some 40,000 "standard tractors" during 1960-1961, while the total number of tractors available in 1962 has been reported at 100,000 units, as compared with 24,600 in 1957.¹² During 1960, Communist Chinese planners assigned 1.1 million tons of finished steel to the production of farm machinery and implements. The corresponding figure during the first four months of 1961 was at about the annual rate of 1.2 million tons, which was probably equivalent to over 10 per cent of the output in 1961,¹³ and considerably in excess of the proportion allocated to the same uses before. Both the steel consumption and the increase in the number of tractors may be regarded as indicators of the magnitude of the effort to "mechanize."

The significance of the effect of such "mechanization" is, however, by no means clear. In spite of the sizable increase in the number of tractors available, the absolute number is still extremely small even though not all the land is suitable for the employment of tractors. Of 80 million hectares reportedly suitable for tractors¹⁴ the area that was "machine cultivated" would probably not exceed one-eighth or under one-tenth of the total cultivated land.¹⁵ According to *Planned Economy*,¹⁶ an increase of 15 to 20 per cent in food grain yield might be expected by employing tractors. In Sinkiang, where tractors have been employed, the increase in yield has averaged 18 per cent.¹⁷ If the 15-20 per cent increase were applied to 10 per cent of the land planted to grain, the resultant increase in total output would amount to 1.5-2 per cent only. Since land suitable for tractors is located in areas with low yields,¹⁸ the actual increase in yield attributable to tractors thus far would therefore be minimal.

Perhaps the essence of the so-called mechanization program lies in the fact that actually the output of tractors, which, together with pumping equipment, constitute the principal category of farm machinery now in production, may not be the most significant part of

⁹ *People's Daily*, June 20, July 29, November 14, December 23 and 28, 1961; January 3, 4, and 6, 1962.

¹⁰ See, for instance, the report on Mukden factories in *Min-chu Ping-lun* (Democratic Review), Vol. 13, No. 17, Hong Kong, September, 1962, p. 306.

¹¹ NCNA, January 18, 1962.

¹² See *Tsu-kuo* (China Weekly), No. 515, Hong Kong, November 19, 1962, pp. 175-182, and the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol. 39, No. 7, Hong Kong, February 14, 1963, pp. 309-310. The "standard tractor" employed in official statistics is a small tractor of 15 h.p. The most common type of tractor produced in Communist China is the "Eastern Red" tractor, which has 54 h.p.

¹³ *China News Analysis*, No. 403, Hong Kong, January 12, 1962.

¹⁴ *People's Daily*, December 12, 1962. According to *China Weekly*, even in the case of new non-mechanized farm implements in general, only .5 per cent of the total demand has been satisfied. Issue of November 19, 1962, pp. 175-182.

¹⁵ According to the *Ta-kung Pao*, November 19, 1962, a "standard tractor" could take care of 100 hectares. At this rate 100,000 tractors would be sufficient for 10 million hectares although full utilization of the tractors may not be possible.

¹⁶ *Chi-hua Ching-chi* (Planned Economy), No. 10, Peking, 1957, pp. 7-10.

¹⁷ See Note 14.

¹⁸ The increased yield in Sinkiang came to 2400 kg. per hectare only.

the current effort to "mechanize" agriculture. A clue to the real situation may be found in many reports emanating from Communist China during the first quarter of 1963¹⁹ concerning the repair and replacement of farm machinery and implements as a major task of the farm machinery manufacturing plants. Replacement and rehabilitation of the capital equipment which fell into disrepair and depreciated during the "Great Leap" appear to have been the major concern in the supply of new farm implements to date, as has been the case in the rehabilitation of the irrigation facilities.

THE SUPPLY OF CHEMICAL FERTILIZERS

The third major activity by which industry is expected to render aid to the agricultural sector consists of the expansion of the chemical fertilizer industry. More than 100 Chinese factories are reported to have been directed to pool their resources in order to increase the domestic output of high pressure condensers, pipes, and other equipment required for the construction of new fertilizer plants.²⁰ Periodic news reports are also available on the successful contribution of individual steel mills to the expansion of the fertilizer industry through the introduction of new steel products. Judged on the basis of current production, the increase in the domestic production of chemical fertilizers was from 1.45 million tons in 1961 to about 2 million tons in 1962.²¹ Compared with the planned output of 2.8 million tons in 1960,²² however, the current output appears to be still below the level reached before the economic crisis. On the other hand, the annual fertilizer requirement, an elusive concept, has been very conservatively estimated by the Communists themselves at 10 million tons for the country as a whole.²³ The 8 million ton gap between requirement and domestic production is currently being partly filled by import. But an additional

supply of some 5 million tons would be required, and a considerable further expansion of the domestic industry would be needed to provide for the demand.

THE ROLE OF INDUSTRY

The preceding account seems to point to certain deductions. First, the industrial sector does not appear to have succeeded thus far in bringing about a significant change in agricultural technology. In spite of the fine sounding slogans of "electrification," "mechanization," and "chemicalization," actual accomplishments in the power, metallurgical, machine manufacturing and chemical industries have not been of a sufficiently large magnitude to influence production dramatically by enabling it to break out of the traditional practices and modes of production. More time and investment would be needed for this purpose.

If this conclusion is correct, it would then follow that whatever degree of recovery agricultural production may have scored during 1962, it was probably essentially a result of other factors. Institutional changes through the modification of the commune system and the greater leeway permitted to private incentive may have been of vital importance at this stage of China's agricultural rehabilitation.

In the second place, in so far as the reorientation of industrial policy and changes in the product mix have contributed to some recovery in agriculture, the effect has been felt through the replacement of capital equipment and rehabilitation of capital installations previously in existence even though some of the latter might not have been in full use. This seems to have been the case in the rehabilitation of irrigation projects, the replacement and repair of farm machinery and implements, and the expansion of the chemical fertilizer industry, none of which has as yet attained the former peak levels or exceeded the peak levels by any significant degree. In other words, considerable disinvestment has taken place since the failure of the "Great Leap," and the role of the industrial sector in aiding economic recovery appears to be the

¹⁹ Many such reports from widespread localities have been issued by the official news media.

²⁰ *China Trade and Economic Newsletter*, No. 89, London, March, 1963, p. 15.

²¹ *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol. 39, No. 7, February 14, 1963, p. 321.

²² *Planned Economy*, No. 4, 1960, pp. 9-10.

²³ *Planned Economy*, No. 10, 1957.

replacement and rehabilitation of this depleted and abused capital stock.

The above deductions suggest to the careful observer that the role of industry in the present context of the Communist Chinese economy is an essential but unambitious one. Capital construction has continued in industries that are either directly related to the expansion of agricultural production or have previously constituted serious bottlenecks. Apart from chemical fertilizers, farm equipment and machinery and some steels, the petroleum industry, the production of non-ferrous metals, and coal and iron ore mining seem to have constituted the sectors singled out for attention. In the case of iron ore and coal mining, depletion and capital consumption during the "Great Leap" probably underlie the often-heard cry of raw material shortage.²⁴ This state of affairs and the nature of Communist policy to solve the problem lend further support to the view that the period 1962–1963 is marked by an effort to stabilize and increase agricultural production, and that any ambitious plan to industrialize further, rapidly and on a massive scale simply cannot be seriously considered at the moment.

THE LEVEL OF INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT

A question of some interest is the level of industrial production in 1962 in relation to 1960 or earlier. Since the policy of retrenchment begun in 1961 has led to the closing of factories not earning their operating cost and of other industrial plants which suffer from raw material shortage, is it possible to make any intelligent guess of the recent level of output of modern industry? One possible approach would be to gauge industrial output on the basis of the consumption of electricity by industry. Since the gross output of elec-

tricity in 1962 has been estimated at 45 billion kwh,²⁵ on the basis of a recent study of the use of energy resources in Communist China,²⁶ allowing for consumption at the power plants and transmission loss, the net supply available would amount to about 39 billion kwh. If power consumption by households, the transportation sector, and agriculture, estimated respectively at 2.6, 0.3, and 1 billion kwh,²⁷ are subtracted, the residual available for industrial consumption would be approximately 35 billion kwh. The corresponding level of modern industry output, estimated on the basis of a regression equation, which we shall not go into here, would probably be around 90 million yuan at 1952 prices. This would be just below the 1959 level or about 17 per cent under the 1960 peak.

If correct, such an estimate would indicate a substantial degree of recovery from the 1961 level, which, *if true*, probably took place during the latter part of 1962. Inasmuch as power consumption in the agricultural and other non-industrial sectors may have been higher, power consumption by modern industry and the corresponding industrial output would probably in reality be less than this estimate. The possibility that greater transmission loss and the appearance of new uses requiring high power input might exist must also be borne in mind. On the other hand, it is not inconceivable for the recovery of modern industry output to be fairly rapid and to exceed the rate of progress of agricultural rehabilitation.

The question as to what the next few years will bring and what will happen to Communist China's industrialization program in the

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Yuan-li Wu is the author of a recent publication, *Economic Development and the Use of Energy Resources in Communist China*, (Praeger, July 1963), as well as of two earlier volumes, *An Economic Survey of Communist China* (Bookman, 1956) and *Economic Warfare*, (Prentice-Hall, 1952). Professor Wu is a Research Associate of the Hoover Institution at Stanford University.

²⁴ See Po I-p'o's article in *Hung-ch'i*, No. 13, May, 1962, p. 1.

²⁵ See Note 1.

²⁶ Yuan-li Wu, *Economic Development and the Use of Energy Resources*, Praeger, 1963.

²⁷ The estimates for household and transportation are 1960 figures based on the study cited in Note 26. The consumption estimate for agriculture is that of 1961 and is taken from *Chukyo josei shuho* (Weekly Reports on Communist China), No. 148, Tokyo, October 24, 1962, p. 7.

CURRENT DOCUMENTS

The U.S.—Russian “Hot Line” Agreement

On June 20, 1963, the United States and the U.S.S.R. agreed to establish a direct communication link between the two governments for use in time of emergency, designed in part at least to prevent an accidental war. The complete text follows:

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS LINK SIGNED ON JUNE 20, 1963, AT GENEVA, SWITZERLAND.

For use in time of emergency, the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have agreed to establish as soon as technically feasible a direct communications link between the two governments.

Each government shall be responsible for the arrangements for the link on its own territory. Each government shall take the necessary steps to insure continuous functioning of the link and prompt delivery to its head of government of any communications received by means of the link from the head of government of the other party.

Arrangements for establishing and operating the link are set forth in the annex which is attached hereto and forms an integral part hereof.

Done in duplicate in the English and Russian languages at Geneva, Switzerland, this 20th day of June, 1963.

ANNEX TO THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE SOVIET UNION SOCIALIST REPUBLICS REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS LINK.

The direct communications link between

Washington and Moscow established in accordance with the memorandum, and the operation of such link, shall be governed by the following provisions.

[1]

The direct communications link shall consist of:

A. Two terminal points with telegraph-teleprinter equipment between which communications shall be directly exchanged;

B. One full-time duplex wire telegraph circuit, routed Washington—London—Copenhagen — Stockholm—Helsinki—Moscow, which shall be used for the transmission of messages;

C. One full-time duplex radio-telegraph circuit, routed Washington—Tangier—Moscow, which shall be used for service communications and for coordination of operations between the two terminal points.

If experience in operating the direct communications link should demonstrate that the establishment of an additional wire telegraph circuit is advisable, such circuit will be established by mutual agreement between authorized representatives of both governments.

[2]

In case of interruption of the wire circuit, transmission of messages shall be effected via the radio circuit, and for this purpose provision shall be made at the terminal points for the capability of prompt switching of all

necessary equipment from one circuit to another.

[3]

The terminal points of the link shall be so equipped as to provide for the transmission and reception of messages from Moscow to Washington in the Russian language and from Washington to Moscow in the English language. In this connection, the U.S.S.R. shall furnish the United States four sets of telegraph terminal equipment, including page printers, transmitters, and reperforators, with one year's supply of spare parts and all necessary special tools, test equipment, operating instructions and other technical literature, to provide for transmission and reception of messages in the Russian language. The United States shall furnish the Soviet Union four sets of telegraph terminal equipment, including page printers, transmitters, and reperforators, with one year's supply of spare parts and all necessary special tools, test equipment, operating instructions and other technical literature, to provide for transmission and reception of messages in the English language. The equipment described in this paragraph shall be exchanged directly between the parties without any payment being required therefor.

[4]

The terminal points of the direct communications link shall be provided with encoding equipment. For the terminal point in the U.S.S.R., four sets of such equipment (each capable of simplex operation), with one year's supply of spare parts, with all necessary special tools, test equipment, operating instructions and other technical literature, and with all necessary blank tape, shall be furnished by the United States to the U.S.S.R. against payment of the cost thereof by the U.S.S.R.

The U.S.S.R. shall provide for preparation and delivery of keying tapes to the terminal point of the link in the United States for reception of messages from the U.S.S.R. The United States shall provide for the preparation and delivery of keying tapes to the terminal point of the link in the U.S.S.R. for

reception of messages from the United States. Delivery of prepared keying tapes to the terminal points of the link shall be effected through the Embassy of the U.S.S.R. in Washington (for the terminal of the link in the U.S.S.R.) and through the Embassy of the United States in Moscow (for the terminal of the link in the United States).

[5]

The United States and the U.S.S.R. shall designate the agencies responsible for the arrangements regarding the direct communications link, for its technical maintenance, continuity and reliability, and for the timely transmission of messages.

Such agencies may, by mutual agreement, decide matters and develop instructions relating to the technical maintenance and operation of the direct communications link and effect arrangements to improve the operation of the link.

[6]

The technical parameters of the telegraph circuits of the link and of the terminal equipment, as well as the maintenance of such circuits and equipment, shall be in accordance with C.C.I.T.T. and C.C.I.R. recommendations. [C.C.I.T.T. is the International Telephone and Telegraph Consultative Committee and C.C.I.R. is the International Radio Consultative Committee.]

Transmission and reception of messages over the direct communications link shall be effected in accordance with applicable recommendations of international telegraph and radio communications regulations, as well as with mutually agreed instructions.

[7]

The costs of the direct communications link shall be borne as follows:

A. The U.S.S.R. shall pay the full cost of leasing the portion of the telegraph circuit from Moscow to Helsinki and 50 per cent of the cost of leasing the portion of the telegraph circuit from Helsinki to London. The United States shall pay the full cost of leasing the

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BOOK REVIEWS

NEW BOOKS ON ASIA

CHINA'S CULTURAL DIPLOMACY. By HERBERT PASSIN. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963. 133 pages and appendix, \$4.50.)

This monograph, initially published in 1962 by *The China Quarterly*, offers an interesting series of articles on the cultural diplomacy of Communist China. Although, as the author cautions, "the material is, by and large, current as of autumn 1960," there is much that is invaluable in Passin's study: the experiences of India, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, and Poland in conducting cultural exchanges with Peking; the types of missions sent, the behavior of the participants, and the obstacles to expansion of cultural missions. His concluding essay deals with the problems and prospects "of serious scholarly work being done by foreigners in Communist China today" and with the limitations that scholars and travelers in China must expect.

The author is to be commended for the skill and judiciousness with which he sought out, digested, and interpreted the oft-fragmentary and unreliable information on this important aspect of Communist Chinese behavior. A.Z.R.

ALBANIA AND THE SINO-SOVIET RIFT. By WILLIAM E. GRIFFITH (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1963. 423 pages and index, \$7.95; \$2.95 in paper.)

No aspect of the Sino-Soviet dispute seems more incongruous than the attention devoted to Albania. As the author of this excellent and timely study notes, "Of all its aspects, the Albanian break with the Soviet Union and the alliance with Communist China have been perhaps the most unexpected and least understood."

With meticulous care and impressive scholarship, Griffith has charted the uneven course of postwar relations between Tirana and Moscow. His introductory chapter sets the stage for post-1960 developments. He then systematically analyzes the genealogy of the dispute, tracing the evolving and changing positions of Albania, Communist China, and the Soviet Union, from the Bucharest conference of June, 1960, to the Twenty-second Congress of the C.P.S.U. in October, 1962.

The value of this illuminating study is greatly enhanced by several hundred pages of documents which are not generally available to students and scholars of Soviet bloc affairs. The combination of the author's penetrating analysis and relevant documentation make this an important addition to our knowledge of the dimensions of the Sino-Soviet dispute. A.Z.R.

INDIA AS A SECULAR STATE. By DONALD EUGENE SMITH. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963. 518 pages, index, \$10.00.)

India's future as a democracy is of great significance not only to the West, but to Asia as well. The role that religion plays in the evolution of the Indian state will have considerable impact upon the degree and durability of India's political democracy. Smith notes that the secular state is "a basic and inseparable component of the modern liberal democratic state." In this pioneer study, he undertakes a systematic and comprehensive investigation of church-state relations in India since 1947. With meticulous care and impressive scholarship he analyzes the historical, social, and political-cultural factors that are at work advancing or retarding the advent of a viable secular state.

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CHINA AND JAPAN

(Continued from page 150)

A number of recent long-term developments would seem to suggest that the obstacles to the growth of Chinese influence in Japan will increase rather than decrease during the next few years. The Japanese Socialists, who spearhead the pro-Peking movement, are maturing ideologically. Last year, at the Eighth World Congress against A and H bombs, they clashed openly with the Chinese Communist delegates over the issue of nuclear testing. This was an unprecedented action because the Japanese Socialists have ordinarily been mere putty in the hands of the Chinese Communists. Peking's opposition to the Soviet policy of "peaceful co-existence" and its condemnation of Yugoslav "revisionism" and Italian "structural reform" have caused further antagonism among Japanese Socialists, many of whom themselves are wedded to such theories. Despite Peking's efforts, a continuing cooling off of relations between Peking and the Socialists is therefore probable.

In the long run it seems likely that China's total impact on Japan will also decrease. Actual Japanese experience in China is now limited almost entirely to the older generation. Culturally and economically, Japan is looking well beyond China and Asia. The growing diversification of Japan's world outlook and its increasing international involvement will tend to reduce China's traditional significance. It also seems unlikely that even a major Chinese economic development program could or would draw so heavily on Japanese participation that it would balance the enormous and growing influence of the American, Southeast Asian and European markets.

Indeed, in the over-all picture there would seem to be more opportunities for Sino-Japanese economic and political rivalry than for cooperation. This is particularly true since Communist influence is weak in Japan and the Communist component of the China image appeals to fewer and fewer Japanese⁶

as Japan advances toward greater prosperity, stability and social justice.

⁶ This trend is confirmed by a number of Japanese public opinion polls, such as the monthly Jiji public opinion poll, which show Communist China consistently as one of the least liked countries (together with the Soviet Union and Korea).

CHINESE IDEOLOGY

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nally rejected by a particular group of Communists, observers not so preoccupied have been able to discern the reality that "Communism can exploit nationalism but nationalism can also penetrate and completely permeate Communism." While some have designated "Marxist-Leninist China" as "eminently orthodox," it nevertheless was acknowledged that the "rational kernel, materialist and dialectical," of traditional Chinese philosophy has been taken into its "new ideological structure." Others have asserted that, specifically, Mao's strategy has "turned communism from a professedly proletarian into a nationalist movement,"²⁴ and that his Sinification of communism, "no doubt," has been "a major reason" for the success of his movement.

In view of the fact that as early as 1917, Mao in his youth started to "invite those interested in the task of saving China who were burdened and determined and ready to make sacrifices for her to become his friends, it is perhaps not too much to grant, in view of his current dispute with Khrushchev, that he and his followers have been "heirs" as much as "re-interpreters" and "critics" of China's traditions.

It has taken an escapee to report the "odd contradiction" that "although the Chinese people don't really want communism they still take pride in the fact that Mao has become a rival of Khrushchev, at least in the field of Communist ideology." Some escapees actually say that "Mao Tse-tung had learnt so much about Marxism-Leninism that he should be the leading Communist figure rather than Khrushchev."²⁵ Only history can tell,

no doubt, although Mao has already achieved his own distinction as a revolutionary thinker as well as a leader in history. At any rate, the case for "Chinese communism" seems to have presented itself.

²⁴ John M. Kautsky, *Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries: Nationalism and Communism*, New York, Wiley, 1962, p. 73.

²⁵ "Interview with a Translator from Shanghai," *Current Scene*, July 10, 1961.

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

(Continued from page 177)

long run can be answered with even less certainty. One can only hint at some of the principal determining factors. The most important of these still will be the rate of recovery of agricultural production and the possibility of a substantial increase in output following much more intensive employment of chemical fertilizers, accompanied by appropriate water utilization, and so forth. Once recovery has been attained, further economic growth at a rapid rate would have to be predicated upon the resumption of large investments to expand the industrial sector.

Experience during the "Great Leap" has demonstrated rather convincingly that the real constraint to economic growth is not so much the regime's necessarily limited ability to depress consumption and increase savings as the inability of the economy to transform savings into capital goods of the proper kinds. Imports of key industrial items will continue to be necessary for many years and will exercise an influence on the rate of growth completely disproportionate to their monetary value. Thus we should not fail to examine the current Sino-Soviet dispute in this light, and the movement now afoot in various Western countries to expand or resume trade with Communist China. There cannot be a more effective means to bolster the economy of mainland China than to supply it with the key industrial and agricultural products that constitute the present bottlenecks, unless it is to do so on credit.

"HOT LINE" AGREEMENT

(Continued from page 179)

portion of the telegraph circuit from Washington to London and 50 per cent of the cost of leasing the portion of the telegraph circuit from London to Helsinki.

B. Payment of the cost of leasing the radio telegraph circuit between Moscow and Washington shall be effected without any transfer of payments between the parties. The U.S.S.R. shall bear the expenses relating to the transmission of messages from Moscow to Washington. The United States shall bear the expenses relating to the transmission of messages from Washington to Moscow.

BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 180)

The importance and interest of this subject, and the clarity and insight with which it is treated, commend it to the attention both of the specialist and the general reader. A.Z.R.

HISTORY AND POLITICS

SYMPOSIUM ON LATIN AMERICA.
(Wellesley, Mass.: Wellesley College, 1963.
223 pages, \$2.50, soft cover.)

This book is the result of a symposium on Latin America held at Wellesley College in February, 1963, and contains the full proceedings of those meetings. Among the 16 distinguished participants are John C. Dreier, Dr. José Figueres, Aaron Copland, Dr. Alberto Lleras Camargo. They explore Latin America's role in world affairs; its relations with the United States; the Alliance for Progress; economic, social and political problems; and cultural developments. This book offers an introduction for the beginning student of Latin American affairs; the specialist will find many perceptive, analytical insights concerning Latin America's problems and progress.

T.H.B.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY Chronology covering the most important events of July, 1963, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon)

July 24—Top Communist leaders from Eastern Europe and Mongolia meet in Moscow under the auspices of Comecon to discuss matters of economic cooperation, the nuclear test-ban treaty and the ideological rift with China.

Disarmament

July 2—Speaking in East Berlin, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev says the Soviet Union is ready to outlaw nuclear testing in the atmosphere, in space and underwater. He also urges that a non-aggression pact between Nato countries and Warsaw Pact members be negotiated "at the conclusion of a test ban treaty."

July 15—Three-power talks on a test ban treaty open in Moscow. Present are Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, United States Under Secretary of State W. Averell Harriman, and Viscount Hailsham, British Minister for Science.

July 24—At the Moscow talks, the U.S.S.R. agrees that a test ban treaty will not be conditional on the signing of a non-aggression pact, while the West agrees to undertake substantive negotiations on such a pact.

July 25—Harriman, Gromyko and Viscount Hailsham initial a partial test ban treaty, outlawing nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water. (See also *U.S.S.R.* and *U.S. Foreign Policy.*)

July 29—French President Charles de Gaulle, at a news conference, declares that France will not adhere to the nuclear test ban

treaty or to an East-West non-aggression pact.

July 30—In Geneva, the 17-nation disarmament conference resumes.

July 31—A statement by the Chinese Communist government calls the nuclear test ban treaty "a big fraud" to promote a "fake peace." The Chinese demand a world conference to provide for the destruction of and to outlaw completely all nuclear weapons.

European Economic Community (Common Market)

July 10—The Council of Ministers begins talks on two key problems: Britain's relationship with the Common Market and the situation regarding U.S. farm imports.

July 11—The Council of Ministers agrees to hold discussions with Britain every 3 months on economic and political matters.

July 16—Minister of Agriculture Werner Schwarz says that West Germany accepts in principle a French compromise proposal on the grain price dilemma facing the Common Market.

July 20—The Common Market countries and their 18 African associates sign a 5-year agreement to liberalize trade and aid.

July 29—The Council of Ministers of the 6 E.E.C. nations opens a 2-day meeting on tariffs.

July 30—The Council fails to agree on any tariff reductions for U.S. poultry.

U.S. officials report that the U.S. will take retaliatory action and bar imports from the E.E.C. equivalent to the loss in U.S. poultry exports.

July 31—Vice-President of the E.E.C. Executive Commission, Robert Marjolin an-

nounces a 5-year plan, 1966-1970, to co-ordinate the economies of the 6 member states with the general growth of the community.

Organization of American States

July 3—The Council of the O.A.S. votes 14 to 1 to recommend a ban in the Western Hemisphere on travel to Cuba.

July 16—The Council appeals to Haiti to observe "the principle of respect for human rights."

United Nations

July 3—A United Nations mission declares that U.N. action is "urgent" in Aden and says the people of the British-controlled area must be allowed to determine their own future.

July 10—Britain informs the committee on colonialism that a U.N. investigating mission will not be admitted to British Guiana.

July 15—The head of the U.N. observation mission in Yemen reports no evidence has been discovered to support Saudi Arabia's charge that Egyptian troops are using poison gas in support of the Yemeni Republic's struggle against a revolt by Yemeni royalists.

Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko proposes that heads of state attend the General Assembly in 1965 to mark the International Cooperation Year voted by the 1962 Assembly. In the letter to U.N. Secretary General U Thant, it is recommended that 1965 become the year of the "complete and final liquidation of the disgraceful system of colonialism."

July 18—The 11-nation committee studying South Africa's racial policies unanimously asks the Security Council to call for an embargo on shipping arms and oil to that country until it abandons apartheid.

July 22—A Security Council meeting opens to hear African complaints that Portugal's treatment of its territories and South Africa's racial policies are threats to world peace.

July 31—The Security Council adopts a reso-

lution, 8-0 (the U.S., Britain and France abstaining), requesting all nations to halt arms shipments and other aid that would help maintain Portugal's colonial rule. The resolution asks that the peoples of Mozambique, Angola and Portuguese Guinea be granted "the right to self-determination" and independence.

The Security Council opens debate on South Africa's racial policies.

ALGERIA

July 9—Hocine Ait-Ahmed, one of the major leaders in the liberation struggle, announces he has decided to lead an "open political struggle" against his former comrade, Premier Ahmed Ben Bella.

ARGENTINA

July 5—The pro-Peronist General Labor Confederation urges its members to cast blank ballots in the forthcoming presidential election to protest the ban against its candidates.

July 7—Dr. Arturo Illía and his Popular Radical party score a major election victory over Peronist groups. The protest "blank-vote" is 16 per cent of the total.

July 31—The electoral colleges in the provinces formally elect Illía as president.

BRAZIL

July 17—President João Goulart signs a bill raising the pay of government civilian and military personnel by 70 per cent.

July 20—The Minister of Mines and Power assures U.S. Ambassador Lincoln Gordon that Brazil intends to pay for seized American-owned public utilities on a long-term basis.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

Canada

July 18—Reacting to U.S. President Kennedy's suggestion of a tax on American investment in foreign securities, the Canadian stock markets suffer a major drop in stock prices.

Great Britain

(See also *Int'l, Disarmament*)

July 1—The Government names H. A. R. Philby, former British diplomat and newsman, as a Soviet agent and the “third man” of the Burgess-Maclean spy case.

July 9—Mass demonstrations demanding the release of Greek political prisoners erupt in London to mark the visit of King Paul and Queen Frederika of Greece.

July 15—A jury finds Dr. Giuseppe Matelli, an Italian physicist, not guilty of spying in Britain for the Soviet Union.

July 16—Defense Minister Peter Thorneycroft presents plans to Parliament for a unified Ministry of Defense.

July 30—*Izvestia* (a Soviet newspaper) publishes an article revealing that H. A. R. Philby has received asylum and citizenship in the Soviet Union.

July 31—The bill enabling peers to disclaim their titles and relinquish membership in the House of Lords becomes law.

India

July 1—The U.S. agrees to lend India \$80 million for an atomic-reactor plant.

July 22—The Government announces its agreement on a U.S.-British plan for joint training exercises for Indian Air Force personnel in the use of complex radar and ground equipment.

Malaya

(See also *Indonesia*)

July 9—Delegates from Malaya, Singapore, British North Borneo and Sarawak sign an agreement forming the Federation of Malaysia, effective August 31. Brunei refuses to sign because of disagreement over financial matters.

July 15—Deputy Prime Minister Abdul Razak answers charges by Indonesia that formation of the new federation would break promises made at recent Tokyo and Manila meetings. He asserts there is still time to determine whether the people of North Borneo and Sarawak wish to join the new government.

July 30—Philippine President Diosdado Macapagal opens the Southeast Asian conference on Malaysia in Manila, where he is host to Indonesian President Sukarno and Malayan Prime Minister Prince Abdul Rahman.

July 31—Macapagal, Sukarno and Prince Abdul Rahman send a cablegram to U.N. Secretary General U Thant asking him to check on the wishes of the people of North Borneo and Sarawak concerning their joining the Federation of Malaysia.

BRITISH EMPIRE, THE

British Guiana

July 6—A formula to end the 11-week general strike is agreed upon by Prime Minister Cheddi Jagan's government and the Trade Unions Council.

July 10—Duncan Sandys, British Colonial Secretary, arrives in Georgetown in an attempt to find a formula for ending the racial and political strife.

British Honduras

July 22—The Colonial Office announces in London that British Honduras will attain internal self-government on January 1, 1964. (See also *Guatemala*.)

Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

July 9—In a statement declaring that its struggle to change the Southern Rhodesian constitution will continue with new militancy, the 7-man national executive of the Zimbabwe African People's Union announces the removal of party leader Joshua Nkomo.

July 20—A public inquiry reveals that Northern Rhodesia is in the grip of a “reign of terror” reminiscent of Nazi Germany, according to British officials. The conflict is between supporters of the 2 African nationalist parties.

Zanzibar

July 15—It is announced that last week's election returned to power the Arab-dominated coalition government headed by Premier Mohammed Shamte Hamadi.

July 17—Soliman Malik, the Cairo representative of the ruling Nationalist party, says the Government will demand the withdrawal of the U.S. military base.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)

July 3—The Chinese delegation arrives in Moscow for ideological talks with the Soviet Union, to open July 5. (See also *U.S.S.R., The.*)

July 20—Chinese delegates return from the deadlocked ideological talks in Moscow.

CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE (Leopoldville)

July 3—The Leopoldville government is told by the U.S., Belgium and other Western countries that extensive economic reforms must be undertaken before \$150 million in technical and financial aid will be forthcoming.

July 20—The U.S. suspends new grants to finance public works and imports until the Government undertakes major fiscal and economic reforms.

CUBA

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

July 3—The arrangement for the release of nearly 10,000 Cuban refugees in exchange for \$53 million worth of food and medical supplies from the U.S. comes to an end.

July 11—President Osvaldo Dorticos Torrado says that while Soviet military instructors and industrial technicians are still in Cuba, all missiles and troops have been removed.

July 12—The Government charges that "hoodlums" paid by the U.S. prevented the discharge of passengers from a Cuban airliner at Grand Cayman, a British Caribbean possession.

July 15—Premier Fidel Castro states that in

the present ideological struggle between Moscow and Peking, he supports Khrushchev.

July 24—The Government expropriates the U.S. Embassy building and grounds in retaliation for the July 8 freezing of Cuban bank accounts in the U.S.

July 26—Swiss officials tell Cuba that they will not evacuate the U.S. Embassy in Havana unless forcibly evicted. The Swiss have custody of the embassy building.

ECUADOR

July 11—A military junta overthrows President Carlos Julio Arosemena Monroy, who is exiled to Panama. He is charged with being a drunkard sympathetic to communism.

July 12—The ruling junta, headed by Captain Ramon Castro Jijon, outlaws the Communist party and promises to wipe out pro-Castro terrorist bands.

FRANCE

(See also *Int'l, Disarmament, and West Germany*)

July 1—Farmers in southern France battle police in protest demonstrations against falling agricultural prices.

July 3—As farm violence continues, the Government imposes a ban on imports of all produce whose price is abnormally low.

July 10—The Government decides to repay in advance more than \$200 million of its foreign debt.

July 23—The government announces its intention to raise wages 10 per cent in public services and nationalized industries. The agricultural subsidy budget is also to be increased next year.

July 25—Over the Senate's veto, the National Assembly approves a bill requiring a 5-day warning period before a strike by transport and public utilities workers.

July 26—The strike warning bill becomes law.

GERMANY, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (East)

July 2—Visiting East Berlin, Soviet Premier

Khrushchev calls for an agreement outlawing nuclear testing and the simultaneous signing of an East-West non-aggression pact.

July 3—At a rally at the East German-Polish frontier, Khrushchev declares that only “madmen” would wage war against capitalist countries to achieve communism.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

July 4—President Charles de Gaulle of France arrives in Bonn for 2 days of consultations with Chancellor Konrad Adenauer.

July 5—A defense spokesman reveals that a 20 per cent shortage of officers is forcing the West German Navy to withdraw more than 20 vessels from active duty.

GREECE

July 14—The Justice Ministry announces that 16 of the 1,097 political prisoners jailed during the 1944–1949 Communist uprising have been released this week.

July 21—Returning to Athens, Queen Fredrika complains that the British press overplayed the anti-Greek demonstrations during the royal visit to London. (See also *Great Britain*.)

GUATEMALA

July 24—Diplomatic relations with Britain are broken because Britain announces its intention to give limited autonomy to British Honduras, which is claimed by Guatemala.

HAITI

(See also *Int'l, O.A.S.*)

July 14—A government communiqué says that the 2 Barbot brothers, leaders in the rebel movement, were killed yesterday in a clash with militiamen.

July 15—Following the announcement of the death of the Barbot brothers, rebels attack major police posts outside Port-au-Prince, capital of Haiti.

HUNGARY

July 1—U.N. Secretary General U Thant arrives in Budapest for an official visit, the first such U.N. visit since the 1956 Hungarian uprising.

July 4—The Government announces it will approve assignments of new Roman Catholic bishops to 6 vacant sees by Pope Paul VI.

INDONESIA

July 10—President Sukarno accuses the Prime Minister of Malaya of a breach of faith by signing the agreement for a Malaysian Federation without first determining the will of the peoples in the territories concerned. He threatens to support operations against Sarawak and North Borneo by rebel groups based in the Indonesian sector of Borneo. (See also *British Commonwealth, Malaya*.)

IRAQ

July 11—Iraq complains to the U.N. Security Council that the Soviet Union is inciting Kurdish rebels.

July 16—Syrian Premier Salah el-Bitar arrives in Baghdad to confer with President Adbel Salam Arif on means “to pave the way for Arab unity.”

ITALY

July 1—President Kennedy confers in Rome with leading Italian statesmen.

July 5—The Senate votes approval of the government of Premier Giovanni Leone.

July 11—Leone’s “caretaker” government receives a vote of confidence in the Chamber of Deputies.

JAPAN

July 12—The Government decides to reject a U.S. plan for limiting Japan’s cotton textile shipments during 1963.

July 17—Premier Hayato Ikeda forms a new cabinet to include leaders of the various factions in the ruling Liberal Democratic party. Eight of the 16 former cabinet members are retained, including Foreign

Minister Masayoshi Ohira and Finance Minister Kakuei Tanaka.

July 27—Dr. Salvador P. Lopez is named foreign secretary.

KOREA, REPUBLIC OF (South)

July 27—General Chung Hee Park, head of the ruling junta, announces that elections for a president will be held in October; for a legislature, in November.

July 29—The U.N. Command announces that North Koreans attacked 3 U.S. soldiers south of the demilitarized border zone. Two are killed and the third is wounded.

LAOS

July 1—The British Foreign Office sends a note to the 14 nations who attended last year's Geneva conference accusing the Soviet Union of refusing to take any steps to halt hostilities in Laos.

July 16—British and Soviet peace envoys return from a visit to the headquarters of the pro-Communist Pathet Lao forces. They report no progress on cease-fire talks.

July 18—The neutralists announce they have repulsed a major Pathet Lao attack on the Plaine des Jarres.

MEXICO

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy.*)

MOROCCO

July 16—Police arrest 130 leaders of the opposition National Union of Popular Forces. Among those arrested are Abderrahim Bouabid, a former deputy premier; Aberahaman Youssefi, a member of the party secretariat; and 21 future members of the Chamber of Representatives elected May 17.

PERU

July 28—Fernando Balaúnde Terry is inaugurated as president. His inauguration ends one year of military rule.

PHILIPPINES, THE

(See also *British Commonwealth, Malaya.*)

July 21—Vice-President Emmanuel Pelaez resigns as foreign secretary.

POLAND

July 4—First Secretary of the United Workers (Communist) party Wladyslaw Gomułka denounces Polish Roman Catholic bishops for their hostility to communism. He reaffirms Poland's support for Khrushchev in the ideological struggle with China.

July 6—The Communist Party's Central Committee decides to postpone its Party congress until 1964, despite statutory provisions for a congress this year.

PORTUGAL

(See also *Int'l, U.N.*)

July 25—The Portuguese government announces that James Pinto Bull, a Negro, has been named secretary general of Portuguese Guinea.

Angola

July 18—Seeking unity among Angola's 6 major rebel groups, a commission of African states (officially the Good-Will Mission to the Angolan Nationalists) gives all its support to Holden Roberto's National Front for the Liberation of Angola as "the only fighting front."

July 19—Agostinho Neto, president of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, declares that he will appeal the commission's decision before the African foreign ministers' conference.

SOUTH AFRICA, REPUBLIC OF

(See also *Int'l, U.N.*)

July 12—Security police arrest Walter Sisulu, leader of the banned African National Congress, and 16 others.

SYRIA

(See also *Iraq and U.A.R.*)

July 8—Major General Ziad el-Hariri is deported to Vienna; under his military leadership the Baath party won power March 8.

July 10—The Baath party's National Revolutionary Council names General Amin el-Hafez Defense Minister and Army Chief of Staff. He is also Interior Minister, Vice-Premier and Deputy Military Governor.

July 18—Immediately after the chief of state, General Louai al-Attassi, leaves to visit President Nasser of the United Arab Republic, pro-Nasser groups try unsuccessfully to seize the Damascus government.

July 19—Following summary trials by military tribunals, 20 rebels are shot.

July 27—The Damascus radio announces that Lieutenant General Louai al-Attassi has resigned as army commander in chief and chairman of the ruling Revolutionary Council. He is succeeded by Major General Amin el-Hafez.

U.S.S.R., THE

July 5—Soviet and Chinese leaders open talks in Moscow aimed at healing their ideological rift. (See also *China and East Germany*.)

July 8—Belgium's Foreign Minister, Paul-Henri Spaak, confers with Khrushchev on East-West problems.

July 14—The Soviet Central Committee officially replies to Chinese charges opposing Khrushchev's policy of peaceful coexistence. The 21,000-word statement cites the Cuban understanding reached with the U.S. as proof that East-West agreements are possible.

July 19—In a major Kremlin speech, Khrushchev attacks Communist "theoreticians" who desire nuclear war. He indirectly accuses the Chinese of seeking to overthrow the present Soviet leadership.

July 20—The Soviet-Chinese talks end.

Khrushchev says the Soviet Union and India stand "side by side" on many international issues, "particularly the problem of securing peace."

July 21—In a joint communiqué issued in Moscow and Peking, leaders of the 2 countries confirm that the talks failed to resolve their differences.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, THE

July 22—President Gamal Abdel Nasser renounces an agreement to unite Egypt, Syria and Iraq. He denounces the Baath regime in Syria. (See also *Syria*.)

UNITED STATES, THE

Economy, The

July 5—The Labor Department reports that employment reached a new high in June of over 70 million, but that unemployment stood at 4.8 million.

July 16—The Federal Reserve Board raises its discount rate from 3 to 3.5 per cent in a move to curb the flow of dollars overseas.

July 17—Kennedy announces that preliminary figures show the deficit for fiscal 1963 to be \$6.3 billion, or \$2.6 billion less than estimated.

July 18—The Labor Department reveals that for the first time in history, average factory earnings in June rose to above \$100 a week.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Int'l*, *Disarmament* and *E.E.C.*, and *Cuba*)

July 3—Responding to Khrushchev's proposal, the U.S. repeats its willingness to accept a limited test ban treaty.

Kennedy returns from his European tour.

The State Department rejects a Soviet protest over the arrest in New York of a Russian couple on espionage charges.

July 8—The U.S. Treasury Department, at the request of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, invokes stringent currency restrictions on public and private Cuban bank deposits in the U.S. Some \$33 million worth of Cuban assets are thus frozen.

July 10—Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs W. Averell Harriman leaves for the Moscow talks on a possible nuclear test ban treaty.

It is revealed that the U.S. has asked Britain to forbid Cuban planes to land on Grand Cayman Island.

July 16—Senator John Williams (Republican, Delaware) tells the Senate that 24

million bushels of feed grain for Austria has been diverted and sold illegally.

July 18—The U.S. and Mexico reach agreement for settlement of the dispute over El Chamizal. The border zone is ceded to Mexico to end a 50-year dispute.

To ease the U.S. balance of payments deficit, Kennedy asks Congress to impose a tax on the purchase of long-term securities issued by foreign countries and corporations.

July 19—Agricultural officials tell a House committee the U.S. was repaid for most of the missing Austrian grain, which is believed to have been privately sold in West Germany.

July 21—The Administration agrees to exempt new Canadian issues from its proposed foreign securities tax.

July 23—Kennedy asks Congress to abolish, over a 5-year period, the quota system of immigration.

July 25—Officials report that the U.S. is protesting Cuba's seizure of the American Embassy in Havana.

July 26—President Kennedy, in a radio and television address, declares that the partial nuclear test ban does not endanger national security and is "a step toward peace."

Government

July 2—A federal grand jury indicts 8 steel companies and 9 executives accused of conspiring to fix prices.

Two couples, including a Soviet U.N. personnel officer and his wife, are arrested on charges of conspiring to spy for the U.S.S.R.

July 9—The Senate approves a compromise agreement for making the final \$73 million payment of Philippine war damage claims.

July 12—Retiring Ambassador John Galbraith leaves India.

July 16—Kennedy orders immediate action to enable the U.S. and Canada to proceed with the harnessing of the tides in Passamaquoddy Bay, on the Maine Coast, to provide electric power for both countries.

July 17—A special 3-judge federal court re-

apportions both houses of the Oklahoma legislature on a strict population basis.

July 21—Kennedy announces he will nominate Howard Jenkins, a Negro Republican, to the National Labor Relations Board.

July 23—The National Aeronautics and Space Administration announces that Dr. George Mueller will succeed Brainerd Holmes as Director of the Office of Manned Space Flight.

July 28—Retiring Ambassador George F. Kennan departs from Yugoslavia after 2 years of service.

July 29—Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon tells the House Ways and Means Committee that an increase in the government debt ceiling is not necessary; he asks for an extension of the present \$309 billion ceiling through November, 1963.

July 30—The Senate approves a bill enlarging the powers of the S.E.C.; one of the bill's 3 major sections deals with protecting investors purchasing over-the-counter securities.

July 31—The Senate confirms Henry Cabot Lodge as ambassador to South Vietnam and Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr., as ambassador to Portugal.

The House votes approval of the \$73 million payment to the Philippines to settle war damage claims.

Labor

July 3—Chief railroad negotiator J. E. Wolfe announces that the nation's railroads will put into effect on July 11 new work rules to reduce the number of employees and eliminate unnecessary jobs.

July 5—The 5 operating railroad unions declare they will call a nationwide strike immediately if the new work rules go into effect.

July 10—Management accepts and labor rejects Kennedy's proposal of July 9 to have Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg make recommendations in the rail dispute. Both sides then accept a presidential plan for postponement of new work rules until July 29.

July 22—Kennedy sends to Congress his proposals for resolving the rail dispute. He recommends that Congress authorize the Interstate Commerce Commission to decide what work rules changes should be made.

July 25—President of the Association of American Railroads Daniel P. Loomis, before the House Commerce Committee, reports that railroad management has agreed to postpone a change in the work rules until August 29. The delay is made following a request by the Senate and House Commerce Committees. This is the seventh delay by management in the 4-year fight over work rules changes.

July 26—Labor Secretary W. Willard Wirtz reopens mediation talks between railroad management and the leaders of the 5 train-operating unions.

Military

July 26—At Cape Canaveral, Syncom II is successfully orbited to become the first synchronous satellite, traveling at the earth's speed and hovering over one area of the globe. Syncom II will be used for intercontinental communications.

Politics

July 13—Governor Nelson Rockefeller of New York declares he is "deeply disturbed" by the "tactics of totalitarianism" employed by the "radical right lunatic fringe" of the Republican party.

July 15—Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona says he views the Rockefeller statement as "just his formal declaration of candidacy." He denies appealing to sectional and "radical right" elements.

Segregation and Civil Rights

July 1—A U.S. Court of Appeals rules that Powhatan County, Virginia, cannot close public schools to avoid a court integration order. A special 3-judge federal court in Alexandria rules that Virginia's laws requiring racially separate seating in movie theaters are unconstitutional and void.

July 2—The Hinds County, Mississippi, grand jury indicts Byron de La Beckwith for the murder of Medgar Evers, field secretary for the N.A.A.C.P.

July 4—In Chicago, Mayor Richard Daley and a Negro leader urging moderation in the civil rights struggle are booed at the annual convention of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.

July 5—The N.A.A.C.P. adopts a series of resolutions to broaden its "direct-action" program against discrimination.

July 9—A federal court orders the Mobile, Alabama, school system to begin desegregation this fall.

July 10—A federal judge orders that a Negro girl be admitted to the University of South Carolina. He also orders integration of state parks.

July 11—Violence erupts in Cambridge, Maryland, after Negro demonstrators try to stage a sit-in at a restaurant.

Over 20 persons are injured as state troops attempt to restore order in Savannah, Georgia, following a demonstration by 2,000 Negroes.

In Durham, North Carolina, a federal judge orders the school board to give Negro students "the absolute right to attend the school of their choice."

July 12—National Guard troops are ordered to Cambridge, Maryland, and martial law is declared.

July 13—New York City police urge the clergy to help curb "hooliganism and rowdyism" outside a Bronx restaurant where civil rights demonstrators have been assaulted by onlookers.

July 16—Defense Secretary Robert McNamara issues orders curtailing participation by military personnel in racial protests.

July 17—Kennedy tells his news conference that he approves of the scheduled civil rights march on August 28 in Washington as long as it avoids violence.

July 18—Police break up a week-old sit-in at the Chicago Board of Education and arrest 10 demonstrators protesting de facto segregation in Chicago schools.

July 19—A Maryland amusement park, scene of racial clashes, agrees to admit Negroes beginning August 28.

July 22—A U.S. Appeals Court backs an order for desegregation of Birmingham, Alabama, schools this fall. The court denies Negro requests for immediate desegregation in the schools of Jackson, Mississippi.

The Governors' Conference in Miami avoids a civil rights stand by voting to abolish its resolutions committee.

July 23—A five-point agreement is signed in Cambridge, Maryland, between Negro leaders and city officials. The Negroes agree to cease their demonstrations in exchange for a charter amendment barring racial segregation in public accommodations.

July 25—Senator A. S. Mike Monroney (Democrat, Oklahoma) reads a letter to the Senate Commerce Committee from Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy. The letter states that there is no evidence that "any of the top leaders of the major civil rights groups are Communists," including the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King.

July 26—Atlanta (Ga.) Mayor Ivan Allen Jr. tells the Senate Commerce Committee that "a public accommodation bill" should be enacted by the Congress.

Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara issues a directive to military commanders empowering them to declare "off limits" areas near military bases where racial discrimination is practiced against servicemen.

The Labor Department's Bureau of Apprenticeship and training issues strict regulations to eliminate racial bias in government-supported apprenticeship training programs.

Negro demonstrators resume picketing in Farmville, Virginia, to protest the discontinuance of public schools in Prince Edward County since 1959.

July 29—Florida Governor Farris Bryant tells the Senate Commerce Committee that the proposed civil rights legislation vio-

lates an individual's private property rights.

McNamara announces the appointment of Alfred B. Fitt as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civil Rights. Fitt will administer the program to eliminate racial discrimination against servicemen in areas near military bases.

July 30—New York City Mayor Richard Wagner holds opening talks with civil rights leaders and representatives of the unions and employers in the building industries on more jobs for Negroes and Puerto Ricans. Demonstrations over equal employment opportunities on public construction projects in New York have led to 691 arrests this month.

July 31—The Justice Department files suit in Birmingham, Alabama. The suit asks the U.S. District Court to order that 2,032 Negroes be registered immediately and that voting registrars in Jefferson County end discriminatory practices.

VATICAN, THE

July 2—U.S. President Kennedy is received in private audience by Pope Paul VI.

July 11—Pope Paul VI receives U.N. Secretary General U Thant and discusses the possible release of Jozsef Cardinal Mindszenty from Hungary.

VIETNAM, (South)

July 15—Buddhist leaders announce a renewal of their religious struggle against the government of Roman Catholic President Ngo Dinh Diem.

July 20—The Government releases 267 Buddhist priests and nuns and removes barbed wire barricades that had been placed around major pagodas.

July 26—It is disclosed that South Vietnamese forces have withdrawn from a base in Zone D, a Viet Cong (Communist) guerrilla stronghold. Some 800 mines were left behind.

July 30—Some 60,000 Buddhists participate in anti-government demonstrations in Saigon and 4 other cities.

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